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Attorney & Court Updates
Disclaimer
The information contained in this article is intended to educate members of the public generally and is not intended to provide case-specific legal advice or solutions to individual problems. Readers are not to attempt to solve individual problems on the basis of information contained herein and are strongly advised to seek competent legal counsel who is familiar with the Immigration Laws before relying on the information contained in theses articles.
Each Immigration case is different, based on the circumstance, rights of the alien and the location of the DHS (INS) office and immigration judge. Please do not take the following articles and court decisions, as possible final answer to your case, as they may vary form the examples.
by Brian K. Bates, Houston, TX
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
BIA April 12, 2005
By Brian K. Bates
Quan, Burdette & Perez, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue Suite 800 Houston, TX 77056 Tel (713) 625-9200
www.quanlaw.com
I. INTRODUCTION
Let's begin with two simple facts: First, many people residing in the United States are not United States citizens. That is why immigration attorneys call earns a living. Second, many people residing in this country occasionally run afoul of its criminal laws. That is why criminal defense attorneys can earn a living. Sometimes, these two groups intersect such that immigration attorneys may find clients accused or even convicted of crimes, and criminal defense attorneys may have clients who are not citizens. Worlds collide. Chaos threatens. Things --often very bad things --happen.
For the most part, the criminal justice system is unconcerned with the citizenship of its customers. Citizens and immigrants are sent to jail without distinction. The criminal defense attorney can therefore manage to perform his or her function with knowing much immigration law. The immigration legal system however, places very significance criminal conduct such that the "civil" immigration consequences €“deportation or removal, permanent exile from the United States, denial of any opportunity to obtain or preserve legal status, etc. -- are frequently far more severe than the harshest possible criminal sentence. Ask yourself: €œWhich would you rather endure, a year in a U.S. jail, or the rest of you life across the world, with no chance to return to your family, home and job in the United States?"
Since the immigration consequences are so severe, both the immigration attorney and the criminal defense practitioner should be aware of those consequences. In some cases, of course, it will not be possible to change the outcome of the criminal trial, nor the immigration proceedings that follow. In many others, however, tragedy may be prevented if the defense attorney and the client are simply aware of the immigration issues. Immigration and criminal defense lawyers can work together to anticipate and prevent unjust results. This paper intends a modest start. Some of the information will be very basic for immigration attorneys, because it is being written from the perspective of an immigration attorney speaking to other attorneys who may have less familiarity with the Immigration and Nationality Act.
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*BRIAN K. BATES practices Immigration and Nationality law with the Houston, Texas firm of QUAN, BURDETTE & PEREZ, P.C. 5177 Richmond Avenue Suite 800 Houston, TX 77056 Tel. (713) 625-9200. He received his undergraduate and legal education at Southern Methodist University (BS 1976 [Political Science], JD 1979) .He has been Board Certified in Immigration and Nationality Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization since 1984, and served for many years on the Board's Immigration and Nationality Law Exam Commission. He is the author of "Good Ideas Gone Bad: Plea Bargains and Resident Aliens, " 66 TEXAS BAR JOURNAL 878 (November 2003), "A Brief Tour of Wonderland: A Practical Introduction to Exclusion Proceedings, " 90-IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (January 1990), and Co-author with B. Hake of €œTale of Two Cites: Due Process and the Plenary Power Doctrine, "92-4 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (April 1992). He is a past Chair of the Texas Chapter, American Immigration Lawyers Association (1993 J, i94), and the Winner of two AILA Texas Chapter Litigation Awards (1988, 1996). He received the Sam Williamson Mentor Award from AILA in June
1998. He is listed in the publications Best Lawyers in America, and Texas Super Lawyers.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION.
Before proceeding, it would be useful to settle some basic terminology. The law defines an "alien" as anyone who is not a citizen or national of the United States (the distinction between a "citizen" and a "national" is subtle, and of no relevance to this discussion). Aliens may generally be divided into two groups: those with permanent legal status in the United States, and those without. Those who are entitled to reside and work here permanently are called "lawful permanent residents" or "LPR's". The card that evidences LPR status is commonly called a "green card," although it has not been green for over years.
After residing in the U.S. for a certain period of time (usually five years after receiving LPR status), an otherwise eligible immigrant may apply to become a United States citizen through a process called "naturalization."
Aliens who are not LPR's may be in the United States legally in a temporary or "nonimmigrant" visa status. Common examples of nonimmigrant categories include tourist visas and border crossing cards, student visas, and several types of temporary worker visas. And, of course, many aliens, especially in the border areas, may be here illegally without any status.
Criminal conduct may be relevant to a non-citizen in several ways. For an alien who is not an LPR, a conviction will almost certainly result in deportation or removal, and even an "admission of the essential elements" of certain offenses may prevent them from ever receiving permanent resident status. For an LPR, convictions of certain offenses will result in deportation or removal. At the very least, a conviction may prevent an otherwise qualified permanent resident from becoming a citizen.
A. Statutory References.
Analyzing a criminal/immigration problem is to a very great extent a function of the interplay of several statutes, all of which must be consulted and cross-checked. The criminal grounds that will make an arriving alien inadmissible are found at INA §212(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The criminal grounds that will make an alien already admitted deportable are found at INA §237(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2). The particularly onerous category of "aggravated felony" is defined at INA §101(a)(43). 8 U.S.C. §1101{a)(43). Finally, many immigration related applications require a showing of" good moral character." The statutory definition of "good moral character" is found at INA §101(f). 8 U.S.C. §1101(f).
There are generally five categories of criminal offenses that will render an arriving alien inadmissible to this country:
(I) crimes involving moral turpitude [INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I);
(2) controlled substance offenses [INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll)];
(3) any combination of two or more offenses that results in an aggregate sentence of five years, regardless of whether the individual crimes themselves would constitute a ground of inadmissibility [INA §212(a)(2)(B)];
(4) prostitution and commercialized vice [INA §212(a)(2)(D)]; and
(5) money laundering [INA §212(a)(2)(I)]. Note that some of these offenses render an alien inadmissible even if there is no conviction; he or she need only admit the essential elements of the offense or, in the case of drug traffickers, the Government need only have "reason to believe." INS §212(a)(2)(A), (C).
There are essentially five classes of criminal offenses that commonly constitute grounds of deportability:
(1) crimes involving moral turpitude [INA §237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii)];
(2) offenses relating to controlled substances [INA §237(a)(2)(B)];
(3) offenses relating to firearms [INA §237(a)(2)(C)];
(4) offenses relating to domestic violence [INA §237(a)(2)(E)]; and
(5) "aggravated felonies" as defined in §101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
There is, of course, considerable overlapping of these categories, all of which may be found in INA §237(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2).
Finally, criminal conduct may affect the issue of good moral character in several ways. Essentially, any criminal offense that renders an alien inadmissible or deportable will also preclude a finding of good moral character if it takes place during the period for which good moral character is required (which varies depending upon the application). INA §101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1101(f)(3). Conviction for an aggravated felony is a permanent bar to good moral character INA §101(t)(8). Imprisonment for an aggregate of 180 days or more during the specified period will preclude a finding of good moral character, regardless of the nature of the offense or offenses and whether they have any other effect under the Immigration and Nationality Act. INA §101(f)(7), 8 U.S.C. §1101(t)(7).
A. Deportation or Removal Proceedings
Proceedings to deport or exclude an alien are conducted before an Immigration Judge, an administrative adjudicator employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a small agency within the Department of Justice. While great strides have been made in recent years to make the proceedings more formal and fair, deportation or removal proceedings, remain very informal in comparison to a criminal trial.
1. Nature of the Proceedings
There is no jury in Immigration Court proceedings: the Immigration Judge is empowered to make both findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Strict rules of evidence do not apply, and hearsay is routinely admitted. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that deportation proceedings are civil in nature, and that the constitutional safeguards available to criminal defendants --such as protection against unlawfully seized evidence and ex post facto application of new legislation do not apply. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
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1 However, this applies only to aggravated felony convictions issued on or after November 29, 1990. 8 CFR §316.10(b )( I )(ii).
(1984); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). ;
Essentially, the only constitutional right that an alien possesses is the right to a "fundamentally fair" expulsion hearing. Arid what passes as "fundamentally fair" in Immigration Court would shock most attorneys practicing in other areas of the law.
Prior to April 1, 1997, there were two types of expulsion proceedings-"deportation" and "exclusion" -depending upon whether the alien had "entered" the United States or was applying for admission. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), however, erased the procedural distinctions between deportation and exclusion proceedings. Effective for proceedings commenced on or after April 1, 1997, IIRIRA combined the two into what is now called "removal proceedings."
A "removal hearing" has been defined as "a court procedure that makes a determination on whether an alien, who is subject to deportation or removal, may be admitted or removed from the United States." Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., et al., IMMIGRATION LEGISLAT0N HANDBOOK (2000). As will be seen, however, an alien with a criminal conviction is usually "subject to deportation or removal," and there is little "whether" for an Immigration Judge to "determine!"
2. How the Proceedings "Proceed"
One thing must be clearly understood: criminal cases are in no way relit gated in Immigration Court. An Immigration Judge will not go behind a criminal conviction, nor question the underlying sufficiency of it. Matter of Roberts, 20 I. & N. Dec. 294 (IA 1991). Submission of a certified copy of the conviction generally constitutes the entire evidentiary portion of the deportation hearing. Whatever is said in that certified copy is conclusively proven in deportation proceedings.
It therefore does not matter what the alien did or did not do - the only thing that matters is what the judgment says he or she did. Deportability becomes a pure question of law: whether the judgment submitted qualifies as a "conviction," and whether the offense qualifies as one of the deportable categories contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
B. Relief from Removal.
A deportation or removal hearing, much like a criminal trial, has two parts. The first part is to determine the issue of deportability or (in the case of an arriving alien) inadmissibility. This is comparable to the guilt or innocence phase of a criminal, trial. The alien (called the "Respondent") is called upon to plead to the charges on the charging document. If any of the charges are denied, a hearing is conducted to determine whether the Respondent is deportable. If deportability is based upon a criminal conviction, documentary evidence of the conviction submitted by the prosecuting attorney from the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is usually the total extent of the evidentiary "hearing," as noted above.
If the Respondent is found deportable, the second phase of the hearing is to determine whether he or she must be deported or whether there is some form of relief from deportation available. This is comparable to the punishment phase of a criminal trial. Some examples of relief include asylum, "cancellation of removal," and various discretionary waivers of deportability or inadmissibility.
All the forms of relief from removal, the various statutory grounds of eligibility and discretionary factors, is a topic far too complicated for a paper like this to provide even a smattering of coverage. Criminal defense practitioners are therefore encouraged to consult an experienced immigration attorney before representing a non-citizen client. Suffice to say for present purposes that where the "INA " provides no relief from removal, as is often the case where deportability is based upon criminal conduct, both phases of the proceedings may be completed in as little as five minutes. The DHS attorney submits an authenticated copy of the criminal judgment, that judgment renders the Respondent deportable and ineligible for any relief, and "No more America for you, Jack!"
III. The Seven Things Everyone Should Know.
George Carlin once had a great comedy routine about the "Seven words you cannot say on television." Well, I hereby offer my thoughts on the "seven things everyone should know about crimes and immigration." Now that we have established some context for the discussion that follows, here are the Seven Things:
A. Anyone Who is Not Citizen Can Be Deported.
Never assume that a client is a citizen just because the have been here virtually all their life. Many LPR' s came as children and have never become United States citizens through naturalization. Never assume that a client won't be deported (the Author prefers the old term, as being less euphemistic and more honest than the newer term "removed") just because he or she has been an LPR for 30 years and the criminal offense charge seems comparatively minor. Unless and until an alien legally obtains United States citizenship, a criminal offense can and frequently does result in deportation. Believe it.
This is especially true of offenses classified as aggravated felonies under INA §101(a)(43). An alien convicted of an "aggravated felony" is deportable and ineligible for most forms of relief, including cancellation of removal, asylum, or voluntary departure. Aggravated felony convictions are therefore most to be avoided, if at all possible. Unfortunately, this is difficult because many of the offenses do not seem "aggravated" and are not "felonies."
For example: Any theft offense with a sentence of at last a year is an "aggravated felony." INA §101(a)(43)(G). Likewise, any "crime of violence" with a sentence of a year is considered an aggravated felony. INA §101(a)(43)(F). Therefore, a misdemeanor conviction for theft or assault, with a sentence of one year, is an aggravated felony.
B. A Deferred Adjudication is a Conviction.
Many immigration and criminal defense attorneys are now aware of this, but it bears repeating: a deferred adjudication is considered a "conviction" for immigration purposes. This was not the case prior to 1996. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985), Martinez-Montoya v.1NS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
In 1996, however, IIRIRA added to the INA for the first time a statutory definition of "conviction." INA §101(a)(48). That definition has two components. A "formal judgment of guilt" entered by a court will always qualify as a conviction. INAI§101(a)(48)(A). However, a conviction can also exist where "adjudication of guilt has been withheld" so long as there has been a finding of guilt or a plea or guilty or nolo contendere and the court has imposed some restraint upon the alien's liberty. INA §101(a)(48)(A)(i) and (ii).
Texas deferred adjudications have now been held to qualify as "convictions" under the new definition. Matter of Punu, Interim Decision No.3364 (BIA: 1998); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999). And the new definition applies retroactively, to deferred adjudications that predated the new definition in 1996. Moosa v. INS, supra. : Under certain circumstances, discussed below, a deferred adjudication can still be a sentencing option with significant benefits in immigration proceedings, but it is clear that aliens can no longer avoid proceedings altogether by deferring the adjudication of guilt.
But that's not all. Once a conviction is deemed to exist, it is becoming nigh impossible to do anything to eliminate it from consideration as an immigration issue. Expungements under state rehabilitative statutes no longer remove the conviction for immigration purposes. Matter of ROLDAN-Santoyo, Int. Dec. No. 3377 (BIA 1999). More recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals has held that even vacating the conviction for rehabilitative reasons or to relieve immigration hardships does not eliminate it for immigration purposes. To be effective immigrant immigration proceedings, the conviction must vacate for "procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings." Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2QO3)..
C. Probation Means Nothing in Immigration Court
Another critical fact that everyone should know is that, in assessing immigration consequences, it makes not one bit of difference if any or even all of the alien's sentence of imprisonment is suspended in lieu of probation. A sentence of one year is considered a sentence of one year, even if the alien never actually served a day in jail.
The reason for this is that, at the same time the definition of a "conviction" was added to the INA, Congress added something else. The statute also provides that, for purposes of the INA,
Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.
INA §101(a)(48)(B), emphasis supplied. Therefore, a sentence, of a year probated is still a sentence of one year.
This is incredibly significant in the immigration context, because the length of the sentence determines in many cases whether an offense is an "aggravated felony." As noted earlier, for example, theft offenses and crimes of violence are aggravated felonies if there is a sentence of at least one year. INA §101(a)(43)(F) and (G). The same is true of certain offenses related to racketeering, gambling, bribery, counterfeiting or forgery, and certain passport offenses. See INA §§lOl(a)(43)(J), (P) and (R).
This creates a situation that is counterintuitive to most defense attorney thinking. A criminal defense attorney representing an alien charged with theft, for example, would probably be happy to negotiate a plea where his client serves no jail time and wouldn't think twice about accepting a year or more in probation. Yet, in so doing, he would almost certainly doom the alien to deportation and permanent banishment. Any alien charged with such an offense would be better off serving a jail sentence of 364 days than a one year probated sentence. That's weird, but true.
D. Sometimes the Sentence Matters.
Next on the list of the "deadly seven" is this unavoidably ambiguous word of caution. While probation means nothing in Immigration Court, sometimes the length of a sentence means a great deal.
Asalready discussed, some criminal offenses become aggravated felonies with a sentence of a year or more. Another way the sentence can become significant is in relation to multiple offenses. For example: an alien with two or more DWI is would not be deportable from the United States because DWI is neither a crime involving moral turpitude nor an aggravated felony. Matter of TORRES-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001); U.S. v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). However, if sentenced to a total of five years, he or she becomes inadmissible and therefore unable to return home after travel outside the U.S. because any two or more crimes with an aggregate sentence of five years makes an alien inadmissible. INA §212(a)(2)(B). Again, a lengthier probated term may be worse in such cases than a shorter sentence actually served in jail.
Incidentally, this is where a deferred adjudication may still be useful, depending on the state sentencing statute. Let's use the Texas deferred adjudication statute as an example. In cases where the length of the sentence is or may become significant for immigration purposes, a deferred adjudication makes a BIG difference because there is no sentence of imprisonment. While a sentence of imprisonment is considered regardless of whether some or all is suspended in lieu of probation there is no mention of a "term of imprisonment" anywhere in the deferred adjudication statute. Tex. Code Of Crim. P.Art. 42.12, §5(b). The Code provides that the court may defer the adjudication of guilt and place the defendant upon probation for a period of up to two years for any misdemeanor, and up to ten years for any felony. But this is NOT a pronouncement of sentence. The €œpronouncement of sentence" comes, if it ever comes, only AFTER an adjudication of guilt. Id.
While a deferred adjudication is now a conviction for immigration purposes, it cannot be a conviction for an "aggravated felony" in those instances where the aggravated felony definition requires a sentence of imprisonment. Nor can the time spent on deferred probation be considered in the aggregate with other sentences. In such cases, a deferred adjudication may still be a critically important sentencing option for the noncitizen defendant.
E. Sometimes the Sentence Does NOT Matter a Damn Bit.
Certain offenses are what they are for immigration purposes regardless of the length of the criminal sentence, and even regardless of whether there IS a sentence. In such cases, obviously, a deferred adjudication has no benefit over any other type of conviction."
Some examples of offenses where the sentence does not matter include:
Murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor, all of which are aggravated felonies under INA §lOl(a)(43)(A) regardless of sentence.
Any controlled substance offense will make an alien deportable regardless of sentence.
JNA §2l2(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll).
Any controlled substance offense will also make an alien deportable regardless of sentence, except for a single offense of simple possession for personal use of less than 30 grams of marijuana.
INA §237(a)(2)(B).
Drug trafficking crimes, which are aggravated felonies regardless of the sentence.
INA §lOl(a)(43)(B).
Any criminal offense relating to a firearm will render an alien subject to deportation regardless of sentence or the severity of the offense. INA §237(a)(2)(C).
Illicit trafficking in firearms is an "aggravated felony regardless of sentence. INA §10l(a)(43)(C).
Domestic violence offenses are deportable offenses regardless of sentence. INA §237(a)(2)(E); and
A single crime involving moral turpitude is a deportable offense if a sentence of a year or more may be imposed -- the actual sentence received is immaterial to deportability. INA §237(a)(2)(A)(i).
F. Sometimes an Alien Needs to Stay in Jail.
The sixth nugget of essential wisdom is that sometimes it is advisable for an alien facing immigration court proceedings to stay in jail. This can arise in two ways.
The first has already been referenced. Since probation does not matter in Immigration Court, it is often far, far better for an alien to serve a shorter sentence in jail than a longer term of probation. Any jail term served that is shorter than one year is advisable where a sentence of one year will be significant under the Immigration and Nationality act.
The second instance where jail can be a "good" thing is where detention by the immigration authorities is likely anyway due to the detention policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Some elaboration on those policies is required.
1. Traditional Detention Policy.
The immigration enforcement authorities have always had the power to arrest and detain aliens whose presence in the country was thought to be unlawful. Such detention power was, however, not penal in nature; again, Immigration Court proceedings are deemed to be civil in nature no matter how uncivil the results may seem.
In keeping with the civil nature of the proceedings, it was generally held that an alien should not be detained or required to post a bond for his release unless there was reason to believe he or she was a security risk to the community, or likely to abscond. Matter of Shaw, 17 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1979). Obviously, in such cases, a criminal history was a relevant determination in considering whether to detain or release on bond, as were any pending criminal charges. Id.
Beginning in 1990, Congress began to shift the presumption against detention. The INA was amended to provide a strong presumption that any alien convicted of an aggravated felony would be detained unless clearly shown not to be a threat or likely to abscond. Matter of De la Cruz, 20 I&N Dec. 346 (BIA 1991). In 1996 (again, in IIRIRA), Congress came full circle.
2. Mandatory Detention.
The Immigration and Nationality Act now provides that, aliens who are deportable or inadmissible for criminal convictions, with few exceptions, are to be taken into custody and may only be released under extremely limited circumstances. INA §236(c). A great deal of litigation has been conducted over the past several years, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that while there have been some victories in habeas corpus proceedings, most have been in District Courts in other Circuits. It is extremely difficult to secure the release of any alien with a criminal conviction from immigration custody.
As a result of this greatly expanded detention authority in, immigration proceedings, the numbers of aliens detained has skyrocketed. In Texas, the DHS contracts with private detention corporations (like Corrections Corporation of America facilities in: Houston and Laredo), as well as various Texas counties for detention space. The Houston DHS: Office frequently must house detainees in surrounding county jails, and €œsurrounding" can mean two or three counties over!
All too often, an alien charged with a criminal offense appears before a judge or magistrate and a bond is set to insure his appearance for the criminal proceedings. Then, after his family goes to considerable expense to secure the alien's release, they discover that instead of being released he is simply moved from one jail to another. Sometimes, he even stays in the same jail and the only thing that changes is who pays for his meals.
Obviously, an alien defendant and the attorney representing him in the criminal case would like to know whether the immigration authorities will release him before they go to the good trouble and expense of securing his release on the criminal charges. Just having the client change jails is obviously useless. Even worse, it can actually be quite BAD in many cases. Unlike pre-trial detention, immigration detention is not generally credited towards any eventual sentence on the criminal case.
Unfortunately, the DHS will not even discuss custody issues until the alien is actually in their custody --and that doesn't happen until he is released by the state and the detainer shifts to I the DHS. An experienced immigration attorney can, however, advise as to whether release on bond is legally possible, and perhaps make an educated guess at whether it is likely. If release by the immigration authorities is impossible or extremely unlikely, it may be best to simply stay in State custody where, at least, the time spent in pre-trial detention may eventually be credited.
G. Attorneys Can Make Wonderful Friends!
The final nugget of wisdom, directed at both immigration and criminal defense attorneys, should be apparent by now: Get to know each other. Buy a few drinks or the occasional lunch. You have a lot to learn from each other.
The practices of immigration and criminal defense attorneys have much in common. Politicians are always wanting to "get tough" with our clients, no matter how tough the laws may already be and without regard to whether "tougher" laws will serve any useful purpose. The American public goes along with these campaigns because our clients are unpopular -- not as individual human beings, but as an anonymous, faceless class. It is difficult to imagine a worse double pejorative than "criminal alien."
While deportation or removal proceedings are civil in nature, the anguish of permanent exile and separation from home and family are most decidedly part of any criminal "sentence" received. In most cases, deportation is the most significant consequence of the conviction and requires more, and not less, consideration than potential jail time or the amount of a fine.
Consideration of the harsh immigration consequences -- frequently including deportation and permanent exile from the United States -- can very quickly change a "good deal" into "NO deal!" Criminal defense attorneys should therefore buddy up to one or more experienced immigration attorneys to help them advise their clients.
Immigration attorneys should, in turn, make several friends in the criminal defense bar. Immigration clients who are charged with a crime need the best possible representation in the criminal proceedings. Aliens with particularly serious convictions may need post-conviction assistance from an expert criminal defense or appellate attorney, to explore any possibilities of vacating the harmful conviction.
Clients generally look for the easiest way out of the most immediate problem. As their attorneys, we must advise them as to all the consequences when they plead to a criminal charge. Often that means associating a criminal or immigration attorney so that the whole problem may be understood. You have to know what is going on before you can properly advise the client.
"If you don't know what I mean, won't you stand up and scream
'Cause there's things going on that you dont know!
--Lynyrd Skynyrd, Things going On
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by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite 2204 Memphis, TN 38137
Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net
Immigration information has become much more accessible since the US Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS, previously INS) expanded its website, www.uscis.gov. On the USCIS website you can download forms, find out about various immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, track the progress of petitions and applications, and find out how long each USCIS office is taking to process each petition or application. You can also find the most recent press releases issued by the USCIS make an appointment with your local USCIS office.
Many Law Firms and Government agencies have useful websites that provide important information to their customers. At the Frager Law Firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com, our address is 5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite 2204 Memphis, TN 38137 Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net we have developed a substantial "LINKS" section where you can find links to the most useful government websites which provide you with the most up-to-date information on immigration and nationality law directly from the agencies that handle your applications.
Our links allow you to browse the US Department of State website (www.state.gov), where you can look at the monthly visa bulletin and find out whether a visa is available for your immigrant visa petition, you can find Country Reports on foreign countries, or you can find information on the annual Diversity Visa (DV) Lottery. Our links also allow you to directly access the websites of US Embassies and Consulates around the world as well as your country's Consulates located in the U.S.
Our links will take you to such. Informational websites as Amnesty International, the United Nations and the UN Human Rights Commission. You can find links to the US Department of Customs and Border Protection, the US Department of Labor, the Office of Immigration Statistics, and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EO1R, the immigration court system). We have compiled all these links as a free service to the visitors of our website, because we want you to be able to make an informed decision regarding your immigration law options.
So please stop by the 'Links' section of the Frager Law Firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com We suggest that you click on the link to the USC1S website. Browse through the immigration forms, find out the filing fee for each form, and get directions to your local USC1S office. USCIS now allows electronic filing ("e-filing") of applications for Work Authorization Cards (Form I765) and Replacement of Green Cards (Form 1-90). USCIS is expected to eventually expand the e-filing program to include other forms, as is being done on the DOL website in the process of filing labor certifications under the new regulations ofPERM.
The EO1R website has a virtual library on their which gives you access to previous precedent Court decisions used by the local Immigration Judges.
We encourage you to look at all these Government websites where this information is available to the general public. You will find links to all these Government sites on the Frager Law firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com. And if you have any questions after visiting these sites, we encourage you to contact us.
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by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite 2204 Memphis, TN 38137
Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net,
If you are not a United States Citizen, the answer to this question may be YES! If you have been charged with a crime, what you say and do will determine whether Immigration (USICE) can arrest and deport you. This could be based on having committed a crime regardless of whether you were convicted by a Court of law.
Under the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), admitting the essential elements of a crime may be enough for a non-United States Citizen to be treated by Immigration authorities as a criminal. Whether you are illegal or have a green card, your ability to remain in this country may still be jeopardized. You do not have to be convicted of a crime. The government only has to have a statement from the non-Citizen, admitting the essential elements of a crime, regardless of whether the person is even arrested or charged with the crime.
The best way to protect yourself from this trap is to give your name and address only and invoke your 5th amendment right to remain silent. You can invoke this right by asking for the right to consult an attorney before answering questions about matters that are criminal charges, which include most immigration violations. Many Attorneys have answering services where they can be reached after hours in such an emergency situation.
If a non-United States Citizen is arrested, then it is important to, know that even if the charges are ultimately dismissed, you may still find that USICE will use these dismissed charges against you. These charges could have the equal force of a conviction, if during this process you have admitted the essential elements of the crime (notwithstanding the fact that the charges were ultimately dismissed). This holds true even if the criminal Judge offers you judicial diversion. At the end of the judicial diversion process ( or after the record is held open for a period of time) and before the charges are dismissed, USICE can place a detainer (hold) on you. You may not be released at the end of the criminal matter, or can be arrested at the conclusion of the case, even though the case was dismissed using the above criteria.
The only circumstances that are not treated as a convictions is an acquittal, nolle prosequi, Governor/Presidential pardon, or a diversion through the District Attorney General [in contrast to judicial diversion. ] Even post -conviction relief, where the conviction is challenged in order to reduce the immigration impact on the non-United States Citizen ( example: expungment) will no longer protect the person, from having that original conviction being used as the basis for removal from the, United States. This is notwithstanding the fact that the original charge has been set aside in lieu of a lesser conviction or outright dismissal.
This complicated and complex group of rules which define what is a conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act is why any non-United States Citizen who has any criminal problem must immediately consult a competent immigration attorney who understands the intricacies of this law. Do not wait until after the criminal matter has been resolved or it may be too late for the Immigration Attorney to help. [Jan 2005]
Back
In recent years there have been a number of court cases that have dealt with Board precedents. The following chart briefly notes when a Board ID has been meaningfully cited by a court. The chart is not inclusive of all Board precedent cited in court cases as it began with Matter of Shaar, 21 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 1996). Please note that Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), is not included as the cases interpreting it are so numerous and are still coming in. Matter of N-J-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 812 (BIA 1997), is also excluded as that case was certified to the Attorney General, who vacated it, and it was subsequently superceded by NACARA. We have recently begun to back track and add earlier Board precedent to the chart. The chart is arranged in simple chronological order and only court precedent cases are cited and relied upon.
Please note that this chart is provided as a convenience to the public and is not intended for use as a legal document when preparing an appeal or for citation purposes.
DISCLAIMER
The information contained
in this article is intended to educate members of the public generally and is
not intended to provide case-specific legal advice or solutions to individual
problems. Readers are not to attempt to solve individual problems on
the basis of information contained herein and are strongly advised to seek
competent legal counsel who is familiar with the Immigration Laws before relying
on the information contained in theses articles.
Each Immigration case is
different, based on the circumstance, rights of the alien and the location of
the DHS (INS) office and immigration judge. Please do not take the following
articles and court decisions, as possible final answer to your case, as they may
vary form the examples.
by Brian K. Bates, Houston, TX
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
BIA April 12, 2005
By Brian K. Bates
Quan, Burdette & Perez, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue Suite 800 Houston, TX 77056
Tel (713) 625-9200
www.quanlaw.com
I. INTRODUCTION
Let's begin with two simple facts: First, many
people residing in the United States are not United States citizens. That is why
immigration attorneys call earns a living. Second, many people residing in this
country occasionally run afoul of its criminal laws. That is why criminal
defense attorneys can earn a living. Sometimes, these two groups intersect such
that immigration attorneys may find clients accused or even convicted of crimes,
and criminal defense attorneys may have clients who are not citizens. Worlds
collide. Chaos threatens. Things --often very bad things --happen.
For the most part, the criminal justice system is
unconcerned with the citizenship of its customers. Citizens and immigrants are
sent to jail without distinction. The criminal defense attorney can therefore
manage to perform his or her function with knowing much immigration law. The
immigration legal system however, places very significance criminal conduct such
that the "civil" immigration consequences €“deportation or removal, permanent
exile from the United States, denial of any opportunity to obtain or preserve
legal status, etc. -- are frequently far more severe than the harshest possible
criminal sentence. Ask yourself: €œWhich would you rather endure, a year in a U.S.
jail, or the rest of you life across the world, with no chance to return to your
family, home and job in the United States?"
Since the immigration consequences are so severe, both the immigration
attorney and the criminal defense practitioner should be aware of those
consequences. In some cases, of course, it will not be possible to change the
outcome of the criminal trial, nor the immigration proceedings that follow. In
many others, however, tragedy may be prevented if the defense attorney and the
client are simply aware of the immigration issues. Immigration and criminal
defense lawyers can work together to anticipate and prevent unjust results. This
paper intends a modest start. Some of the information will be very basic for
immigration attorneys, because it is being written from the perspective of an
immigration attorney speaking to other attorneys who may have less familiarity
with the Immigration and Nationality Act.
____________________________
*BRIAN K. BATES practices Immigration and Nationality law with the Houston, Texas firm of QUAN, BURDETTE & PEREZ,
P.C. 5177 Richmond Avenue Suite 800 Houston, TX 77056 Tel. (713) 625-9200. He received his undergraduate and legal education at Southern Methodist
University (BS 1976 [Political Science], JD 1979) .He has been Board Certified
in Immigration and Nationality Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
since 1984, and served for many years on the Board's Immigration and Nationality
Law Exam Commission. He is the author of "Good Ideas Gone Bad: Plea Bargains
and Resident Aliens, " 66 TEXAS BAR JOURNAL 878 (November 2003), "A Brief
Tour of Wonderland: A Practical Introduction to Exclusion Proceedings, "
90-IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (January 1990), and Co-author with B. Hake of €œTale
of Two Cites: Due Process and the Plenary Power Doctrine, "92-4 IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGS (April 1992). He is a past Chair of the Texas Chapter, American
Immigration Lawyers Association (1993 J, i94), and the Winner of two AILA Texas
Chapter Litigation Awards (1988, 1996). He received the Sam Williamson Mentor
Award from AILA in June
1998. He is listed in the publications Best Lawyers in America, and
Texas Super Lawyers.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION.
Before proceeding, it would be useful to settle
some basic terminology. The law defines an "alien" as anyone who is not a
citizen or national of the United States (the distinction between a "citizen"
and a "national" is subtle, and of no relevance to this discussion). Aliens may
generally be divided into two groups: those with permanent legal status in the
United States, and those without. Those who are entitled to reside and work here
permanently are called "lawful permanent residents" or "LPR's". The card that
evidences LPR status is commonly called a "green card," although it has not been
green for over years.
After residing in the U.S. for a certain period
of time (usually five years after receiving LPR status), an otherwise eligible
immigrant may apply to become a United States citizen through a process called
"naturalization."
Aliens who are not LPR's may be in the United States legally in a
temporary or "nonimmigrant" visa status. Common examples of nonimmigrant
categories include tourist visas and border crossing cards, student visas, and
several types of temporary worker visas. And, of course, many aliens, especially
in the border areas, may be here illegally without any status.
Criminal conduct may be relevant to a non-citizen
in several ways. For an alien who is not an LPR, a conviction will almost
certainly result in deportation or removal, and even an "admission of the
essential elements" of certain offenses may prevent them from ever receiving
permanent resident status. For an LPR, convictions of certain offenses will
result in deportation or removal. At the very least, a conviction may prevent an
otherwise qualified permanent resident from becoming a citizen.
A. Statutory References.
Analyzing a criminal/immigration problem is to a very great extent a function of
the interplay of several statutes, all of which must be consulted and
cross-checked. The criminal grounds that will make an arriving alien
inadmissible are found at INA §212(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The criminal
grounds that will make an alien already admitted deportable are found at INA
§237(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2). The particularly onerous category of
"aggravated felony" is defined at INA §101(a)(43). 8 U.S.C. §1101{a)(43).
Finally, many immigration related applications require a showing of" good moral character." The statutory definition of "good moral character" is
found at INA §101(f). 8 U.S.C. §1101(f).
There are generally five categories of criminal
offenses that will render an arriving alien inadmissible to this country:
(I) crimes involving moral turpitude [INA
§212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I);
(2) controlled substance offenses [INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll)];
(3) any combination of two or more offenses that
results in an aggregate sentence of five years, regardless of whether the
individual crimes themselves would constitute a ground of inadmissibility [INA
§212(a)(2)(B)];
(4) prostitution and commercialized vice [INA §212(a)(2)(D)]; and
(5) money laundering [INA §212(a)(2)(I)]. Note
that some of these offenses render an alien inadmissible even if there is no
conviction; he or she need only admit the essential elements of the offense or,
in the case of drug traffickers, the Government need only have "reason to
believe." INS §212(a)(2)(A), (C).
There are essentially five classes of criminal
offenses that commonly constitute grounds of deportability:
(1) crimes involving moral turpitude [INA
§237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii)];
(2) offenses relating to controlled substances
[INA §237(a)(2)(B)];
(3) offenses relating to firearms [INA
§237(a)(2)(C)];
(4) offenses relating to domestic violence [INA
§237(a)(2)(E)]; and
(5) "aggravated felonies" as defined in
§101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
There is, of course, considerable overlapping of these categories, all of which
may be found in INA §237(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2).
Finally, criminal conduct may affect the issue of
good moral character in several ways. Essentially, any criminal offense that
renders an alien inadmissible or deportable will also preclude a finding of good
moral character if it takes place during the period for which good moral
character is required (which varies depending upon the application). INA
§101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1101(f)(3). Conviction for an aggravated felony is a
permanent bar to good moral character INA §101(t)(8). Imprisonment for an
aggregate of 180 days or more during the specified period will preclude a
finding of good moral character, regardless of the nature of the offense or
offenses and whether they have any other effect under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. INA §101(f)(7), 8 U.S.C. §1101(t)(7).
A. Deportation or Removal Proceedings
Proceedings to deport or exclude an alien are conducted before an
Immigration Judge, an administrative adjudicator employed by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a small agency within the Department of
Justice. While great strides have been made in recent years to make the
proceedings more formal and fair, deportation or removal proceedings, remain
very informal in comparison to a criminal trial.
1. Nature of the Proceedings
There is no jury in Immigration Court
proceedings: the Immigration Judge is empowered to make both findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The Strict rules of evidence do not apply, and hearsay
is routinely admitted. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
deportation proceedings are civil in nature, and that the constitutional
safeguards available to criminal defendants --such as protection against
unlawfully seized evidence and ex post facto application of new
legislation do not apply. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
______________________________
1 However, this applies only to aggravated felony convictions issued on
or after November 29, 1990. 8 CFR §316.10(b )( I )(ii).
(1984); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522 (1954).
;
Essentially, the only constitutional right that
an alien possesses is the right to a "fundamentally fair" expulsion hearing.
Arid what passes as "fundamentally fair" in Immigration Court would shock most
attorneys practicing in other areas of the law.
Prior to April 1, 1997, there were two types of
expulsion proceedings-"deportation" and "exclusion" -depending upon whether the
alien had "entered" the United States or was applying for admission. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"),
however, erased the procedural distinctions between deportation and exclusion
proceedings. Effective for proceedings commenced on or after April 1, 1997,
IIRIRA combined the two into what is now called "removal proceedings."
A "removal hearing" has been defined as "a court procedure that makes a
determination on whether an alien, who is subject to deportation or removal, may
be admitted or removed from the United States." Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., et
al., IMMIGRATION LEGISLAT0N HANDBOOK (2000). As will be seen, however, an
alien with a criminal conviction is usually "subject to deportation or removal,"
and there is little "whether" for an Immigration Judge to "determine!"
2. How the Proceedings "Proceed"
One thing must be clearly understood: criminal cases are in no way relit
gated in Immigration Court. An Immigration Judge will not go behind a criminal
conviction, nor question the underlying sufficiency of it. Matter of Roberts, 20 I. & N. Dec. 294 (IA 1991).
Submission of a certified copy of the conviction generally constitutes the
entire evidentiary portion of the deportation hearing. Whatever is said in that
certified copy is conclusively proven in deportation proceedings.
It therefore does not matter what the alien did
or did not do - the only thing that matters is what the judgment says he
or she did. Deportability becomes a pure question of law: whether the judgment
submitted qualifies as a "conviction," and whether the offense qualifies as one
of the deportable categories contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
B. Relief from Removal.
A deportation or removal hearing, much like a criminal trial, has two
parts. The first part is to determine the issue of deportability or (in the case
of an arriving alien) inadmissibility. This is comparable to the guilt or
innocence phase of a criminal, trial. The alien (called the "Respondent") is
called upon to plead to the charges on the charging document. If any of the
charges are denied, a hearing is conducted to determine whether the Respondent
is deportable. If deportability is based upon a criminal conviction, documentary
evidence of the conviction submitted by the prosecuting attorney from the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is usually the total extent of the
evidentiary "hearing," as noted above.
If the Respondent is found deportable, the second
phase of the hearing is to determine whether he or she must be deported or
whether there is some form of relief from deportation available. This is
comparable to the punishment phase of a criminal trial. Some examples of relief
include asylum, "cancellation of removal," and various discretionary waivers of
deportability or inadmissibility.
All the forms of relief from removal, the various
statutory grounds of eligibility and discretionary factors, is a topic far too
complicated for a paper like this to provide even a smattering of coverage.
Criminal defense practitioners are therefore encouraged to consult an
experienced immigration attorney before representing a non-citizen client.
Suffice to say for present purposes that where the "INA " provides no relief
from removal, as is often the case where deportability is based upon criminal
conduct, both phases of the proceedings may be completed in as little as five
minutes. The DHS attorney submits an authenticated copy of the criminal
judgment, that judgment renders the Respondent deportable and ineligible for any
relief, and "No more America for you, Jack!"
III. The Seven Things Everyone Should Know.
George Carlin once had a great comedy routine about the "Seven words you
cannot say on television." Well, I hereby offer my thoughts on the "seven
things everyone should know about crimes and immigration." Now that we have
established some context for the discussion that follows, here are the Seven Things:
A. Anyone Who is Not Citizen Can Be Deported.
Never assume that a client is a citizen just
because the have been here virtually all their life. Many LPR' s came as
children and have never become United States citizens through
naturalization. Never assume that a client won't be deported (the Author prefers
the old term, as being less euphemistic and more honest than the newer term
"removed") just because he or she has been an LPR for 30 years and the criminal
offense charge seems comparatively minor. Unless and until an alien legally
obtains United States citizenship, a criminal offense can and frequently does
result in deportation. Believe it.
This is especially true of offenses classified as
aggravated felonies under INA §101(a)(43). An alien convicted of an "aggravated
felony" is deportable and ineligible for most forms of relief, including
cancellation of removal, asylum, or voluntary departure. Aggravated felony
convictions are therefore most to be avoided, if at all possible. Unfortunately,
this is difficult because many of the offenses do not seem "aggravated" and are
not "felonies."
For example: Any theft offense with a sentence of at last a year is an
"aggravated felony." INA §101(a)(43)(G). Likewise, any "crime of violence" with
a sentence of a year is considered an aggravated felony. INA §101(a)(43)(F).
Therefore, a misdemeanor conviction for theft or assault, with a sentence of one
year, is an aggravated felony.
B. A
Deferred Adjudication is a Conviction.
Many immigration and criminal defense attorneys
are now aware of this, but it bears repeating: a deferred adjudication is
considered a "conviction" for immigration purposes. This was not the case prior
to 1996. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985), Martinez-Montoya v.1NS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
In 1996, however, IIRIRA added to the INA for the first time a statutory
definition of "conviction." INA §101(a)(48). That definition has two components.
A "formal judgment of guilt" entered by a court will always qualify as a
conviction. INAI§101(a)(48)(A). However, a conviction can also exist where
"adjudication of guilt has been withheld" so long as there has been a finding of
guilt or a plea or guilty or nolo contendere and the court has imposed some
restraint upon the alien's liberty. INA §101(a)(48)(A)(i) and (ii).
Texas deferred adjudications have now been held
to qualify as "convictions" under the new definition. Matter of Punu, Interim Decision No.3364 (BIA: 1998); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th
Cir. 1999). And the new definition applies retroactively, to deferred
adjudications that predated the new definition in 1996. Moosa v. INS, supra. : Under certain circumstances, discussed below, a deferred adjudication can
still be a sentencing option with significant benefits in immigration
proceedings, but it is clear that aliens can no longer avoid proceedings
altogether by deferring the adjudication of guilt.
But that's not all. Once a conviction is deemed
to exist, it is becoming nigh impossible to do anything to eliminate it from
consideration as an immigration issue. Expungements under state rehabilitative
statutes no longer remove the conviction for immigration purposes. Matter of
ROLDAN-Santoyo, Int. Dec. No. 3377 (BIA 1999). More recently, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has held that even vacating the conviction for
rehabilitative reasons or to relieve immigration hardships does not eliminate it
for immigration purposes. To be effective immigrant immigration proceedings, the
conviction must vacate for "procedural or substantive defect in the underlying
criminal proceedings." Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2QO3)..
C. Probation Means Nothing in
Immigration Court
Another critical fact that everyone should know is that, in assessing
immigration consequences, it makes not one bit of difference if any or even all
of the alien's sentence of imprisonment is suspended in lieu of probation. A
sentence of one year is considered a sentence of one year, even if the alien
never actually served a day in jail.
The reason for this is that, at the same time the
definition of a "conviction" was added to the INA, Congress added something
else. The statute also provides that, for purposes of the INA,
Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of
incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in
whole or in part.
INA §101(a)(48)(B), emphasis supplied.
Therefore, a sentence, of a year probated is still a sentence of one year.
This is incredibly significant in the immigration
context, because the length of the sentence determines in many cases whether an
offense is an "aggravated felony." As noted earlier, for example, theft offenses
and crimes of violence are aggravated felonies if there is a sentence of at
least one year. INA §101(a)(43)(F) and (G). The same is true of certain offenses
related to racketeering, gambling, bribery, counterfeiting or forgery, and
certain passport offenses. See INA §§lOl(a)(43)(J), (P) and (R).
This creates a situation that is counterintuitive
to most defense attorney thinking. A criminal defense attorney representing an
alien charged with theft, for example, would probably be happy to negotiate a
plea where his client serves no jail time and wouldn't think twice about
accepting a year or more in probation. Yet, in so doing, he would almost
certainly doom the alien to deportation and permanent banishment. Any alien
charged with such an offense would be better off serving a jail sentence of 364
days than a one year probated sentence. That's weird, but true.
D.
Sometimes the Sentence Matters.
Next on the list of the "deadly seven" is this unavoidably ambiguous word of
caution. While probation means nothing
in Immigration Court, sometimes the length of a sentence means a great deal.
As already discussed, some criminal
offenses become aggravated felonies with a sentence of a year or more. Another
way the sentence can become significant is in relation to multiple offenses. For
example: an alien with two or more DWI is would not be deportable from the
United States because DWI is neither a crime involving moral turpitude nor an
aggravated felony. Matter of TORRES-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001);
U.S. v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). However, if sentenced to a total of five
years, he or she becomes inadmissible and therefore unable to return home after
travel outside the U.S. because any two or more crimes with an aggregate
sentence of five years makes an alien inadmissible. INA §212(a)(2)(B). Again, a
lengthier probated term may be worse in such cases than a shorter sentence
actually served in jail.
Incidentally, this is where a deferred adjudication may still be useful,
depending on the state sentencing statute. Let's use the Texas deferred
adjudication statute as an example. In cases where the length of the sentence is
or may become significant for immigration purposes, a deferred adjudication
makes a BIG difference because there is no sentence of imprisonment. While a sentence of imprisonment is considered regardless of whether some or
all is suspended in lieu of probation there is no mention of a "term of
imprisonment" anywhere in the deferred adjudication statute. Tex. Code Of Crim. P.Art. 42.12, §5(b). The Code provides that the court may defer the
adjudication of guilt and place the defendant upon probation for a period of up
to two years for any misdemeanor, and up to ten years for any felony. But this
is NOT a pronouncement of sentence. The €œpronouncement of sentence" comes, if
it ever comes, only AFTER an adjudication of guilt. Id.
While a
deferred adjudication is now a conviction for immigration purposes, it cannot be
a conviction for an "aggravated felony" in those instances where the aggravated
felony definition requires a sentence of imprisonment. Nor can the time spent on
deferred probation be considered in the aggregate with other sentences. In such
cases, a deferred adjudication may still be a critically important sentencing
option for the noncitizen defendant.
E.
Sometimes the Sentence Does NOT Matter a Damn Bit.
Certain offenses are what they are for
immigration purposes regardless of the length of the criminal sentence, and even
regardless of whether there IS a sentence.
In such cases, obviously, a deferred adjudication has no benefit over any other
type of conviction."
Some examples of offenses where the sentence
does not matter include:
Murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor, all of which are aggravated felonies under INA
§lOl(a)(43)(A) regardless of sentence.
Any
controlled substance offense will make an alien deportable regardless of
sentence.
JNA §2l2(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll).
Any controlled substance offense will also make an alien deportable
regardless of sentence, except for a single offense of simple possession for
personal use of less than 30 grams of marijuana.
INA §237(a)(2)(B).
Drug trafficking crimes, which are aggravated felonies regardless of the
sentence.
INA §lOl(a)(43)(B).
Any criminal offense relating to a firearm will
render an alien subject to deportation regardless of sentence or the severity of
the offense. INA §237(a)(2)(C).
Illicit trafficking in firearms is an "aggravated felony regardless of
sentence. INA §10l(a)(43)(C).
Domestic violence offenses are deportable offenses regardless of sentence. INA
§237(a)(2)(E); and
A single crime involving moral turpitude is a
deportable offense if a sentence of a year or more may be imposed -- the
actual sentence received is immaterial to deportability.INA §237(a)(2)(A)(i).
F. Sometimes an Alien
Needs to Stay in Jail.
The sixth nugget of essential wisdom is that sometimes it is advisable
for an alien facing immigration court proceedings to stay in jail. This can
arise in two ways.
The first has already been referenced. Since
probation does not matter in Immigration Court, it is often far, far better for
an alien to serve a shorter sentence in jail than a longer term of probation.
Any jail term served that is shorter than one year is advisable where a sentence
of one year will be significant under the Immigration and Nationality act.
The second instance where jail can be a "good"
thing is where detention by the immigration authorities is likely anyway due to
the detention policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Some elaboration
on those policies is required.
1. Traditional Detention Policy.
The
immigration enforcement authorities have always had the power to arrest
and detain aliens whose presence in the country was thought to be unlawful.
Such detention power was, however, not penal in nature; again, Immigration
Court proceedings are deemed to be civil in nature no matter how uncivil the
results may seem.
In keeping with the civil nature of the proceedings, it was generally
held that an alien should not be detained or required to post a bond for his
release unless there was reason to believe he or she was a security risk to the
community, or likely to abscond. Matter of Shaw, 17 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA
1979). Obviously, in such cases, a criminal history was a relevant
determination in considering whether to detain or release on bond, as were any
pending criminal charges. Id.
Beginning in 1990, Congress began to shift the
presumption against detention. The INA was amended to provide a strong
presumption that any alien convicted of an aggravated felony would be detained
unless clearly shown not to be a threat or likely to abscond. Matter
of De la Cruz, 20 I&N Dec. 346 (BIA 1991). In 1996 (again, in IIRIRA),
Congress came full circle.
2. Mandatory Detention.
The Immigration and Nationality Act now provides
that, aliens who are deportable or inadmissible for criminal convictions, with
few exceptions, are to be taken into custody and may only be released under
extremely limited circumstances. INA §236(c). A great deal of litigation has
been conducted over the past several years, discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice to say that while there have been some victories in
habeas corpus proceedings, most have been in District Courts in other Circuits.
It is extremely difficult to secure the release of any alien with a
criminal conviction from immigration custody.
As a result of this greatly expanded detention
authority in, immigration proceedings, the numbers of aliens detained has
skyrocketed. In Texas, the DHS contracts with private detention corporations
(like Corrections Corporation of America facilities in: Houston and Laredo), as
well as various Texas counties for detention space. The Houston DHS: Office
frequently must house detainees in surrounding county jails, and €œsurrounding"
can mean two or three counties over!
All too often, an alien charged with a criminal
offense appears before a judge or magistrate and a bond is set to insure his
appearance for the criminal proceedings. Then, after his family goes to
considerable expense to secure the alien's release, they discover that instead
of being released he is simply moved from one jail to another. Sometimes, he
even stays in the same jail and the only thing that changes is who pays
for his meals.
Obviously, an alien defendant and the attorney
representing him in the criminal case would like to know whether the
immigration authorities will release him before they go to the good trouble and
expense of securing his release on the criminal charges. Just having the client
change jails is obviously useless. Even worse, it can actually be quite BAD in
many cases. Unlike pre-trial detention, immigration detention is not generally
credited towards any eventual sentence on the criminal case.
Unfortunately, the DHS will not even discuss custody issues until the alien is
actually in their custody --and that doesn't happen until he is released by the
state and the detainer shifts to I the DHS. An experienced immigration attorney
can, however, advise as to whether release on bond is legally possible, and
perhaps make an educated guess at whether it is likely. If release by the
immigration authorities is impossible or extremely unlikely, it may be best to
simply stay in State custody where, at least, the time spent in pre-trial
detention may eventually be credited.
G. Attorneys Can
Make Wonderful Friends!
The final nugget of wisdom, directed at both
immigration and criminal defense attorneys, should be apparent by now: Get to
know each other. Buy a few drinks or the occasional lunch. You have a lot
to learn from each other.
The practices of immigration and criminal defense
attorneys have much in common. Politicians are always wanting to "get tough"
with our clients, no matter how tough the laws may already be and without regard
to whether "tougher" laws will serve any useful purpose. The American public
goes along with these campaigns because our clients are unpopular -- not as
individual human beings, but as an anonymous, faceless class. It is difficult to
imagine a worse double pejorative than "criminal alien."
While deportation or removal proceedings are civil in nature, the
anguish of permanent exile and separation from home and family are most
decidedly part of any criminal "sentence" received. In most cases, deportation
is the most significant consequence of the conviction and requires more,
and not less, consideration than potential jail time or the amount of a fine.
Consideration of the harsh immigration
consequences -- frequently including deportation and permanent exile from the
United States -- can very quickly change a "good deal" into "NO deal!" Criminal
defense attorneys should therefore buddy up to one or more experienced
immigration attorneys to help them advise their clients.
Immigration attorneys should, in turn, make
several friends in the criminal defense bar. Immigration clients who are charged
with a crime need the best possible representation in the criminal proceedings.
Aliens with particularly serious convictions may need post-conviction assistance
from an expert criminal defense or appellate attorney, to explore any
possibilities of vacating the harmful conviction.
Clients generally look for the easiest way out of
the most immediate problem. As their attorneys, we must advise them as to all the consequences when they plead to a criminal charge. Often that means
associating a criminal or immigration attorney so that the whole problem may be
understood. You have to know what is going on before you can properly advise the
client.
"If you don't know what I mean, won't you
stand up and scream
'Cause there's things going on that you don It know!
--Lynyrd Skynyrd, Things going On
Back
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite
2204 Memphis, TN 38137
Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net
Immigration information has become much more
accessible since the US Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS, previously
INS) expanded its website, www.uscis.gov. On the USCIS website you can
download forms, find out about various immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, track
the progress of petitions and applications, and find out how long each USCIS
office is taking to process each petition or application. You can also find the
most recent press releases issued by the USCIS make an appointment with your
local USCIS office.
Many Law Firms and Government agencies have useful
websites that provide important information to their customers. At the Frager
Law Firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com, our address is 5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite 2204 Memphis, TN
38137 Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net we have developed a substantial
"LINKS" section where you can find links to the most useful government websites
which provide you with the most up-to-date information on immigration and
nationality law directly from the agencies that handle your applications.
Our links allow you to browse the US Department of State website (www.state.gov), where you can look at the monthly visa bulletin and find out whether a
visa is available for your immigrant visa petition, you can find Country Reports
on foreign countries, or you can find information on the annual Diversity Visa (DV)
Lottery. Our links also allow you to directly access the websites of US
Embassies and Consulates around the world as well as your country's Consulates
located in the U.S.
Our links will take you to such. Informational websites as Amnesty
International, the United Nations and the UN Human Rights Commission. You can
find links to the US Department of Customs and Border Protection, the US
Department of Labor, the Office of Immigration Statistics, and the Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EO1R, the immigration court system). We have
compiled all these links as a free service to the visitors of our website,
because we want you to be able to make an informed decision regarding your
immigration law options.
So please stop by the 'Links' section of the
Frager Law Firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com We suggest that
you click on the link to the USC1S website. Browse through the immigration
forms, find out the filing fee for each form, and get directions to your local
USC1S office. USCIS now allows electronic filing ("e-filing") of applications
for Work Authorization Cards (Form I765) and Replacement of Green Cards (Form
1-90). USCIS is expected to eventually expand the e-filing program to include
other forms, as is being done on the DOL website in the process of filing labor
certifications under the new regulations of PERM.
The EO1R website has a virtual library on their which gives you access to
previous precedent Court decisions used by the local Immigration Judges.
We encourage you to look at all these Government
websites where this information is available to the general public. You will
find links to all these Government sites on the Frager Law firm website, www.fragerlawfirm.com. And if you have any questions after visiting these sites,
we encourage you to contact us.
Back
by Barry L. Frager, Memphis, TN
5100 Poplar Avenue Clark Tower 22nd Floor Suite
2204 Memphis, TN 38137
Tel. (901) 763-3188 our e-mail address is bfrager@wolfcnaso.net,
If you are not a United States
Citizen, the answer to this question may be YES! If you have been charged with a
crime, what you say and do will determine whether Immigration (USICE) can arrest
and deport you. This could be based on having committed a crime regardless of
whether you were convicted by a Court of law.
Under the Immigration
& Nationality Act (INA), admitting the essential elements of a crime may be
enough for a non-United States Citizen to be treated by Immigration
authorities as a criminal. Whether you are illegal or have a green card, your
ability to remain in this country may still be jeopardized. You do not have to
be convicted of a crime. The government only has to have a statement from the
non-Citizen, admitting the essential elements of a crime, regardless of whether
the person is even arrested or charged with the crime.
The best way to protect
yourself from this trap is to give your name and address only and invoke your
5th amendment right to remain silent. You can invoke this right by asking for
the right to consult an attorney before answering questions about matters that
are criminal charges, which include most immigration violations. Many Attorneys
have answering services where they can be reached after hours in such an
emergency situation.
If a non-United States Citizen
is arrested, then it is important to, know that even if the charges are
ultimately dismissed, you may still find that USICE will use these dismissed
charges against you. These charges could have the equal force of a conviction,
if during this process you have admitted the essential elements of the crime
(notwithstanding the fact that the charges were ultimately dismissed). This
holds true even if the criminal Judge offers you judicial diversion. At the end
of the judicial diversion process ( or after the record is held open for a
period of time) and before the charges are dismissed, USICE can place a detainer
(hold) on you. You may not be released at the end of the criminal matter, or can
be arrested at the conclusion of the case, even though the case was dismissed
using the above criteria.
The only circumstances that are
not treated as a convictions is an acquittal, nolle prosequi,
Governor/Presidential pardon, or a diversion through the District Attorney
General [in contrast to judicial diversion. ] Even post -conviction relief,
where the conviction is challenged in order to reduce the immigration impact on
the non-United States Citizen ( example: expungment) will no longer protect the
person, from having that original conviction being used as the basis for removal
from the, United States. This is notwithstanding the fact that the original
charge has been set aside in lieu of a lesser conviction or outright dismissal.
This complicated and
complex group of rules which define what is a conviction under the Immigration
and Nationality Act is why any non-United States Citizen who has any criminal
problem must immediately consult a competent immigration attorney who
understands the intricacies of this law. Do not wait until after the criminal
matter has been resolved or it may be too late for the Immigration Attorney to
help. [Jan 2005]
Back
In recent years
there have been a number of court cases that have dealt with Board precedents.
The following chart briefly notes when a Board ID has been meaningfully cited by
a court. The chart is not inclusive of all Board precedent cited in court cases
as it began with Matter of
Shaar,
21 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 1996). Please note that Matter of
Soriano,
21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), is not included as the cases interpreting
it are so numerous and are still coming in. Matter of
N-J-B-,
21 I&N Dec. 812 (BIA 1997), is also excluded as that case was certified to the
Attorney General, who vacated it, and it was subsequently superceded by NACARA.
We have recently begun to back track and add earlier Board precedent to the
chart. The chart is arranged in simple chronological order and only court
precedent cases are cited and relied upon.
Please
note that this chart is provided as a convenience to the public and is not
intended for use as a legal document when preparing an appeal or for citation
purposes.
Court Decisions Relating to
Board Precedents |
Board Cite |
Board Holding |
Court Response |
J-,
2 I&N Dec. 285 (1945) |
for
deportability based on admitting acts which constitute the essential
elements of a crime, conduct must be a crime, alien must be advised in clear
manner of the essential elements, alien must admit the conduct, and
admission must be voluntary |
Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) - cited with approval |
M-, 3 I&N
Dec. 850 (1950) |
"Legal
custody" can include "actual uncontested custody" |
Bagot
v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2005) - adopts rationale |
B-,
5 I&N Dec. 698 (1954) |
Proxy
marriage not recognized even where parties have lived together if marriage
not consummated after the proxy marriage |
Moussa
v. INS, 302 F.3d 823(8th Cir. 2002) - cited with approval |
K-,
7 I&N Dec. 594 (1957) |
for
deportability based on admitting acts which constitute the essential
elements of a crime, alien must have been furnished an understandable
definition of the crime and all its elements |
Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) - cited with approval |
MacCaud, 14 I&N Dec. 429 (1973) |
Passport is
evidence of citizenship, but not conclusive evidence |
Palavra v. INS, 287 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval |
Medina,
15 I&N Dec. 611 (1976) |
A.
Conviction for aggravated assault with deadly weapon is crime involving
moral turpitude
B. Moral
turpitude can lie in criminally reckless conduct |
A. Yousefi v. INS,
260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001) - agrees with,
and finds assault with dangerous weapon a crime involving moral turpitude
B. Knapik v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) - upholds, finding conviction for attempted reckless endangerment is cimt |
Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (1978) |
for extreme
hardship, consider length of residence, ties to U.S.,involvement in
community, immigration history, etc. |
Chete
Juarez v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited generally with approval |
Patel,
16 I&N Dec. 600 (1978) |
Board remand
is effective for stated purpose and all other matters IJ deems appropriate
unless Board qualifies or limits the remand |
Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 2002) - agrees with and interprets to require that for remand to be limited, Board must specifically retain
jurisdiction and limit remand to specific purpose |
Da
Lomba,
16 I&N Dec. 616 (1978) |
241(f) can
forgive deportability under section 241(c), a charge grounded squarely on
212(a)(19) fraud charge |
Virk
v. INS, 295 F.3d 1055
(9th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval |
Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (1979) |
state court
motive of defeating deportability is a permissible purpose for first
offender statute |
Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval |
Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225 (1980) |
forging
immigration documents is a crime involving moral turpitude |
Omagah
v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2002) - finds decision reasonable |
Garcia-Flores,
17 I&N Dec. 325 (1980) |
regulatory
violation by INS results in exclusion of evidence only where reg. benefits
alien and violation resulted in prejudice to alien |
Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002)- upholds |
Boromand, 17 I&N Dec. 450 (1980) |
absent
evidence of sham marriage, cannot deny adj based solely on non-viability of
marriage at time of adj. |
Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval |
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (1980) |
When name on
INS records is same as respondent's , may infer they relate to him, absent a
denial by the respondent |
Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2001) - cites generally with approval |
McMillan, 17 I&N Dec. 605 (1981) |
visa
preference based on stepchild relationship only requires a valid marriage,
without further qualification |
Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval,
but finds that Board did not apply the ruling in this case |
Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (1982) |
sets forth
criteria for determining whether crime is "particularly serious" |
1. Yousefi v. INS, 260
F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001) - upholds the criteria, but finds not applied in this case
2. Steinhouse v. Ashcroft,
247 F.Supp.2d 201 (D. Conn. 2003) - upholds criteria, but finds Board failed to consider the important criterion of whether the alien
presents a danger to the community |
Fedorenko, 19 I&N Dec. 57 (1984) |
Board's
function is to review, not create, the record, and it is not required to
receive new evidence on appeal |
1.
Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc) - reversing its earlier decision
in this case, holds Board should have considered new evidence
2. Ordonez v. INS,
345 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects |
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (1985) |
A.
"Particular social group" is group sharing common, immutable characteristic
B. Asylum
applicant must show country-wide persecution |
A.1. Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) cites generally with approval
A.2. Ahmed v. Ashcroft,
348 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval
A.3. Lin v. Ashcroft,
356 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, also noting family as potential particular social group
A.4. Elien v. Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 392(1st Cir. 2004) - cited with approval
B.
Manzoor v. INS, 254
F.3d 342 (1st Cir. 2001) - cautions that burden is on INS, not alien, to show no nation-wide threat, if past
persecution has been shown |
Valencia,
19 I&N Dec. 354 (1986) |
Summary
dismissal ok where no brief and only generalized statement on Notice of
Appeal |
Vargas-Garcia v. INS, 287 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2002) - does not reject, but criticizes the rigid requirements, saying the appeal form does not adequately warn of
possible S/D |
Torres, 19 I&N Dec. 371 (1986) |
A. aliens in
exclusion are not eligible for suspension
B. Paroled
aliens are properly in exclusion, not deportation proceedings |
A.1. Sherifi v. INS, 260
F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2001) - upholds
A.2. Simeonov v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited generally with approval
B. Assa'ad v. U.S. Attorney
General, 332 F.3d
1321(11th Cir. 206/5/03) - cited generally with approval |
Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (1987) |
asylum
applicant must show more than civil strife; states what must be shown, and
states alien must show persecutor "could easily become aware" of protected
beliefs , etc. |
Eduard
v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182 ( 5th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval |
Balibundi, 19 I&N Dec. 606 (1988) |
will not
consider application for relief on the merits where alien fails to appear |
Kaur
v. INS, 237 F.3d 1098
(9th Cir. 2001) - distinguished - here, alien appeared but declined to testify without chance to review
evidence |
Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (1988), affirmed (see cite) |
imposes
several requirements for making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel |
1.
Lozada v. INS,* 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988) - affirmed
2. Castillo-Perez v.
INS,
212 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2000) - Lozada reqs. "not sacrosanct" - substantial
compliance may be sufficient
3. Lara v. Trominski, 216
F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2000) - upholds requirements
4. Hernandez v. Reno, 238
F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) - upholds requirements
5. Saakian v. INS, 252
F.3d 21(1st Cir. 2001) - agrees with 9th Cir. that reqs. may not be
"arbitrarily" applied
6. Stroe v. INS,
256 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2001) - upholds,
and rejects any exceptions to Lozada rules - also questions whether there is constitutional right to counsel in
deportation proceedings
7. Lu v. Ashcroft,
259 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2001) - upholds requirements, BUT failure to file bar
complaint not fatal if reas. explanation
8. Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS,
282 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2002) - Lozada reqs. need not always be "rigidly applied."
9. Melkonian v. Ashcroft,
320 F.3d 1061(9th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval, including
req. that prejudice be shown
10. Hamid v. Ashcroft,
336 F.3d 465 (6th Cir 2003) - upholds requirements
11. Lo v. Ashcroft,
341F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) - makes clear that 9th Cir. will not
rigidly apply the requirements
12. Azanor v. Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) - 9th Cir. Will require
affidavit regarding atty conduct where facts are not plain on the record,
and also prejudice must be shown
13. Dakane v. U.S. Attorney
General, 371 F.3d
771(11th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval, including
req. that prejudice be shown
14. Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft,
2004wl1977670 (9th Cir. 2004) - cites generally, and finds erroneous advice regarding change in law did not
taint fairness of proceedings
15. Mohammed v. Gonzales,400
F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) - on prejudice req, states alien only
need show "plausible grounds" for relief |
Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (1088) |
A. dangers
arising from employment as policeman is not persecution
B. with
regard to particular social group and immutable characteristics, makes
distinction between current and former policemen |
A. Estrada-Escobar v. Ashcroft,
376 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 2004) - upholds, and finds rationale applies to
terrorist activities, including those of Shining Path.
B.
Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348
F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2003) - does not reject, but states that distinction "may have gone too
far" |
Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 1988) |
Hearsay is
admissible in deportation proceedings unless fundamentally unfair |
Velasquez-Valencia v. INS, 244 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001) - cited with approval |
Huang, 19 I&N Dec. 749 (1988) |
to qualify
as returning lawful permanent resident, alien must be returning from a
temporary visit abroad |
1. Moin v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval
2. Khodagholian v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval |
Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I&N Dec. 811 (1988) |
Activity
related to civil war is not persecution unless the harm is shown to have
been inflicted to overcome a belief or characteristic |
Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval |
Chen,
20 I&N Dec. 16 (1989) |
Alien who
has suffered past persecution may be granted asylum for humanitarian reasons
even without well-founded fear of future persecution |
1. Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d
998 (9th Cir. 2001) - upholds reasoning, but finds Board did not properly apply decision in this case -
finds Chen does not require ongoing disability
2. Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) cites with approval
3. Brucaj v. Ashcroft,
381F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval |
Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (1989) |
Board must
follow circuit court precedent in cases arising in the circuit |
Abdulai v. INS, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) - generally cited |
Soleimani, 20 I&N Dec. 99 (1989) |
A. alien not
firmly resettled if presence in the U.S. is a consequence of his flight in
search of refuge
B. Foreign
law is a matter to be proven by the party seeking to rely upon it
C. Finding
of firm resettlement does not bar asylum, but is only factor to consider in
exercising discretion |
A. Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d
591(6th Cir. 2001) - generally cited, with approval
B. Abdille v.Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) - followed (on issue of burden of proof in proving foreign law)
C. Diallo v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004) - notes no longer good law under asylum statute |
Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142 (1990) |
where family
and alien were singled out due to political beliefs, well-founded fear shown |
Corado
v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval |
Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (1990) |
state drug
conviction can constitute "drug trafficking crime" under 18 USC § 924(c)(2)
and thus be an ag fel if it would have been punishable under federal law as
a felony |
Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002) - accepts analysis (see also
Davis, 20 I&N Dec.
536, below) |
Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 196 (1990) |
212(c)
applicant with serious criminal history has burden of showing unusual or
outstanding equities to warrant grant |
U.S.
v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051(9th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval |
Medrano, 20 I&N Dec. 216 (1991) |
motion to
reconsider based on legal argument that could have been raised on appeal
will be denied |
Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval |
Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (1990) |
Proceedings
begin when charging document is filed with Immigration Judge |
Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval |
Huete, 20 I&N Dec. 250 (1991) |
for proper
service of OSC by certified mail, need return receipt signed by alien or
responsible person at his address |
Adeyemo v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2004) - distinguishes where certified mail receipt bears illegible signature - that is not
sufficient to create presumption of delivery to alien or responsible person |
Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (A.G. 1991) |
EWI is not
eligible for 212(c) relief because there is no comparable ground of
exclusion |
Farquharson v. Ashcroft, 246 F.3d 1317 11th Cir. 2001) - upholds |
Patel, 20 I&N Dec. 368 (1991) |
"Entry"
requires (1) crossing into U.S., (2) inspection and admission or EWI, and
(3) freedom from official restraint |
Sidhu
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) - adopts the definition,
citing cases from other circuits that have also done so |
Cerna,
20 I&N Dec. 399 (1991) |
motions to
reopen and motions to reconsider are fundamentally different with different
requirements |
Zhao
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 265 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2001) - cites with approval |
D-L-
& A-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 409 (1991) |
Aliens who
lived an worked for 6 years in a third country as lawful temporary residents
with option to become permanent residents were firmly resettled there. |
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) - cites with approval |
Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (1992) |
A. where
motion to remand really in nature of motion to reopen, it must comply with
motion to reopen requirements
B. MTR
should not be granted unless new evidence could not have been discovered
earlier by "due diligence" |
A. Wang v. Ashcroft, 260
F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2001) - upholds
B. Krougliak v. INS,
289 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval |
A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492 (1992) |
5-year
imprisonment bar to 212(c) relief applies to aliens regardless of when the
conviction occurs (with exception regarding crimes added to af fel
definition by IMMACT 1990, if crime committed before that Act) |
Toia
v. Fasano, 334 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects, finding 5-year bar does not apply to aliens who pleaded guilty prior to 1990
Act, and who are otherwise eligible |
Beltran, 20 I&N Dec. 521 (1992) |
conviction
for solicitation to commit a controlled substance offense renders alien
deportable as one convicted of drug offense |
1.
Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2004) - upholds as reasonable interpretation
2. Coronado-Durazo v. INS,
123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) - distinguishes, where Az solicitation statute encompasses underlying offenses
that are not drug offenses |
Davis,
20 I&N Dec. 536 (1992); modified Yanez, 23 I&N 390 (2002) |
A. state
drug conviction can be ag fel if analogous to felony under federal law and
it contains a "trafficking element"
B. where
underlying offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, conspiracy or
attempt to commit such crime is cimt |
A. Gerbier v. Holmes,
280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002) - accepts analysis (see
also Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171, above)
B. Knapik v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) - agrees with,
but distinguishes where crime involves recklessness, because acting
recklessly is inconsistent with mens rea required for attempt |
Serna,
20 I&N Dec. 579 (1992) |
possession
of altered immigration documents not a CIMT unless there is intent to use
them unlawfully |
Omagah
v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2002) - finds decision reasonable |
Rainford, 20 I&N Dec. 598 (1992) |
firearms
conviction does not preclude finding of admissibility in conjunction with
application for adjustment |
Drax
v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98
(2d Cir. 2003) - Generally cited and
applied |
R-, 20 I&N Dec. 621 (1992) |
Asylum
applicant must show country-wide persecution |
Manzoor v. INS, 254 F.3d 342 (1st Cir. 2001) - cautions that burden is on INS, not alien, to show no countrywide threat, if past
persecution has been shown |
Z-,
20 I&N Dec. 707 (1993) |
"Entry"
requires (1) crossing into U.S., (2) inspection and admission or EWI, and
(3) freedom from official restraint |
1. Nyirenda v. INS, 279
F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2002) - adopts definition
2. Farquharson v. Ashcroft,
246 F.3d 1317 11th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval |
Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (1993) |
212(c) may
be available in conjunction with adjustment for aliens deportable for drug
and weapons offenses |
1. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Roque,
165 F.Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) - Generally cited and applied
2. Drax v. Reno,
338 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2003)- Generally cited with approval and applied |
Sosa-Hernandez, 20 I&N Dec. 762 (1993) |
241(f)
waives not only alien's deportability, but the underlying fraud, and alien
is considered lawfully admitted for permanent residence |
Virk
v. INS, 295 F.3d 1055
(9th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval |
Alcantar, 20 I&N Dec. 801 (1994) |
Conviction
for involuntary manslaughter under Illinois law is "crime of violence" under
8USC §16, and thus an ag fel. |
1. Park v. INS,
252 3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) - reaches same conclusion , in case involving
California involuntary
manslaughter statute (mentions Alcantar in fn)
2. Omar v. INS,
298 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval in finding that criminal vehicular homicide under
Minn. law is a crime of violence |
Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (1990) |
sexual
orientation can form basis for asylum application |
1.
Hernaez v. INS, 244
F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2001) - cited with approval
2. Amanfi v. Ashcroft,
328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) - cited with approval,
but finds Board did not properly apply |
Franklin,
20 I&N Dec. 867 (1994), aff'd (see cite) |
Missouri conviction for involuntary manslaughter is CIMT - statute
required gross deviation from reasonable person's standard of care |
Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995), affirmed |
Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 27 (1995) |
Where
service of OSC is by certified mail, there is strong presumption of
effective service |
1. Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2002) - distinguished, because under later statute, service of notice may be by
regular mail
2. Ghounem v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 740 (2004) -distinguished,
because strong presumption of delivery cannot be applied under later statute
only requiring delivery by regular mail
3. Adeyemo v. Ashcroft,
383 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2004) - distinguishes where certified mail receipt bears illegible signature - that is
not sufficient to create presumption of delivery to alien or responsible
person |
Arreguin
de Rodriguez,
21 I&N Dec. 38 (1995) |
in
exercising discretion, will not give substantial weight to arrest report,
absent conviction or corroborating evidence |
Billike-Rolosa v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 708(6th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, but finds IJ/Board did not apply it |
B-,
21 I&N Dec. 66 (1995) (ID 3251) |
asylum
granted due to compelling circumstances despite no well-founded fear |
Lal v.
INS, 255 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2001) - cited
with approval, but
finds Board did not properly apply decision in this case - finds grant of
asylum under Chen does not require ongoing disability |
D-V-,
21 I&N Dec. 77 (1993) |
rape can
constitute persecution to support asylum claim |
Zubeda
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) - cited with approval |
L-G-,
21 I&N Dec. 89 (1995) (ID 3254), modified Yanez,
23 I&N 390 (2002) |
For
immigration purposes, a state drug offense qualifies as a "drug trafficking
crime," under 18 USC 924(c),and thus as an ag fel, only if punishable as a
felony under federal drug laws. |
1. U.S. v. Hernandez-Avalos,
251F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001) - rejects Board interpretation of § 924(c)
as "plainly incorrect."
2. Gerbier v. Holmes,
280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002) - accepts analysis (see also
Barrett, 20 I&N Dec.
171, and Davis,
20 I&N Dec. 536, above) |
Rivera-Claros,
21 I&N Dec. 232 (1996) |
automatic
stay that is granted when filing MTR in absentia hearing continues during
appeal from denial of such motion |
Kay v.
Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 664 (7th Circuit. 2004) - cites with approval |
Mendez-Moralez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (1996) |
Discusses
factors to consider in adjudicating application for discretionary relief
under section 212(h) |
Virk
v. INS, 295 F.3d 1055
(9th Cir. 2002) - cites with approval in 241(f) case
|
Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330 (1996) (ID 3275) |
Board won't
look behind record of conviction to factual circumstances of crime
|
1. Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d
105 (2d Cir. 2001) - cites with approval (in footnote)
2. Tokatly v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval, and
followed |
H-,
21 I&N Dec. 337(1996) (ID 3276) |
A. asylum
may be granted due to compelling circumstances despite no well-founded fear
B.
Membership in a clan can constitute membership in a particular social group |
A.1. Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d
998 (9th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval, but finds Board did not properly apply decision in this case -
finds grant of asylum under Chen does not require ongoing disability
B.1. Hagi-Salad v. Ashcroft,
359 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2004) - cites generally with approval
B.2. Mohamed v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2005) - cites generally with approval |
Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (1996) |
FGM can be
the basis for a persecution claim |
1.
Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, but does not extend to allow derivative asylum based on fear that her daughters
(lprs) will be subject to the practice if they return with her, with court
emphasizing that they do not have to return
2.
Abay v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, and asylum granted where alien fears she will not be able to
protect her daughter (also in proceedings) from the practice
3.
Balogun v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2004) - distinguishes, because alien came here several times before first making her
FGM asylum claim
4. Mohammed v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) - approves, and finds part. social group could be defined as Somali tribe or all Somali
women. Also, presumption of well-founded fear cannot be rebutted because
harm is ongoing |
L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (1996) |
A. Reopening
may be had where new facts indicate reasonable likelihood of success on
merits, so that hearing would be worthwhile
B. Board may
deny MTR where regulatory requirements not met, or no prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief sought |
A.
Kay v. Ashcroft, 387
F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval
B. Kay v. Ashcroft,
387 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval |
Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I&N 472 (1996) (ID 3284) |
Ineffective
assistance of counsel may be "exceptional circumstance" excusing failure to
appear (where MTR is timely), and notes that prejudice need not be shown
|
1. Saakian v. INS,
252 F.3d 21(1st Cir. 2001) - cites with approval
2. Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS,
327 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2003) cites with approval
3. Lo v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 934 (9th Cir 2003) - cites no prejudice req. with
approval |
S-P-,
21 I&N Dec. 486 (1996) (ID 3287) |
A. Asylum
applicant must show reasonable person would fear persecution OAO, but
motivation for persecution need not be shown to a certainty.
B.
persecution for "imputed" grounds can satisfy refugee definition |
A. Velasquez-Valencia v. INS,
244 F.3d 48(1st Cir. 2001) - cites with approval
B. Amanfi v. Ashcroft,
328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) - cites with approval, but finds Bd. did not
properly apply rule in case involving person people believed to be
homosexual |
Shaar,
21 I&N Dec. 541 (1996) (ID 3290), affirmed (see cite) |
filing MTR
during V D time not an "exceptional circumstance" |
1. Shaar v. INS*,
141 F.3d 953 (9th 1998)- affirmed
2. Mardones v. McElroy,
197 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1999) - cited with approval
3. Azarte v. Ashcroft,
394 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2005) - rejects Shaar post-IIRIRA, holds that where MTR
is filed within voluntary departure time, voluntary departure is tolled
while Board considers motion
4. Barrios v. Attorney General,
399 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2005) - rejects, finds MTR filed within voluntary departure time constitutes "exceptional
circumstance" to forgive failure to depart, even in pre-IIRIRA case |
Rivera-Claros, 21 I&N Dec. 599 (1996) (ID 3296) |
A. MTR in
absentia hearing based on ineffective assistance claim denied where Lozada requirements not satisfied
B. A showing
of prejudice is not required to obtain relief from an in absentia order |
A.1. Lara v. Trominski,
216 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2000) - cited with approval
A.2. Saakian v. INS,
252 F.3d 21(1st Cir. 2001) - cites with approval, and distinguishes b/c Lozada satisfied on appeal to Board
A.3. Lu v. Ashcroft,
259 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2001) - cautions that failure to file bar complaint is not always fatal to ineffective
assistance claim
B.1. Lo v. Ashcroft, 341
F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval |
X-P-T- , 21 I&N Dec. 634
(1996) |
alien forced
to have an abortion or undergo sterilization is eligible for asylum and
withholding |
Qu v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) - upholds,
as to both asylum and withholding |
S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (1997) (ID 3303) |
A. even
where alien is credible, may need corroborating evidence in asylum case
where reasonable to expect, or provide explanation for absence of such
evidence.
B.
Immigration Judge and Service have role in providing evidence in asylum
cases |
A.1. Ladha v. INS,
215 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000) corroboration req. "disapproved" if credible testimony
A.2. Diallo v. INS,
232 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000) - upholds corrob. req. (though remands on facts)
A.3. Kataria v. INS,
232 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) - reiterates its disapproval of S-M-J-
A.4. Abdulai v. INS,
239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) - corrob. req. is not per se
invalid (but remands
on facts)
A.5. Kayembe v. Ashcroft,
334 F.3d 231(3d Cir. 2003) - cites with approval, upholding
requirements
A.6. Miah v. Ashcroft,
346 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2003) - cites reqs. generally with
approval
A.7. Dia v. Ashcroft,
353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) - cites requirements for
requiring corrob. with approval
A.8. Balogun v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites generally with approval,
but notes also Board's
holding that corroboration required only as to "material facts"
A.9. Berishaj v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, but notes 3-part inquiry necessary for corroboration
A.10. El-Sheikh v. Ashcroft,
388 F.3d 643(8th Cir. 2004) - upholds, but emphasizes 3-part inquiry for requiring corrob.
A.11. Gontcharova v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2004) - upholds, but notes rule depends on reasonableness of expecting evidence
A.12. Dorosh v. Ashcroft,
398 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 2004) - upholds corrob req.
B. Mulanga v. Ashcroft,
349 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2003) - cites with approval |
C-A-L-, 21 I&N Dec. 754 (1997)(ID 3305) |
need to show
country-wide fear of persecution |
1. Abdille v.Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) - follows
2.
Manzoor v. INS, 254
F.3d 342 (1st Cir. 2001) - cautions that burden is on INS, not alien, to show no country-wide threat, if past
persecution has been shown |
T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (1997) (ID 3307), reversed (see cite) |
A. criminal
extortion is not persecution "on account of" political opinion where
reasonable to conclude those who did the harm were not motivated by the
applicant's political beliefs
B. DOS
Opinions owed considerable deference, absent contradictory evidence. |
A. Borja v. INS*,
175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) - reversed; finds motivation was in part political
B. Manzoor v. INS,
254 F.3d 342 (1st Cir. 2001) - appears to reject - says DOS opinions not binding |
N-K-
& V-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 879 (1997) |
If Lozada reqs met, claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can form basis for MTR
after alien ordered excluded in absentia |
Osei
v. INS, 305 F.3d 1205
(10th Cir. 2002) - cited with approval |
Fuentes-Campos,
21 I&N Dec. 905 (1997) (ID 3318) |
aliens in
exclusion still 212(c) eligible post-AEDPA, even though those in deportation
are not |
1. U.S. v. Estrada-Torres,
179 F. 3d 776 (9th Cir. 1999) - rejects reasoning of Fuentes-Campos; "it makes no sense" to bar 212(c) in dep. proc., but not in excl. - finds
the relief eliminated for both (post- AEDPA OSC and conviction)
2. De Sousa v. Reno,
190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999) - "assumes, without deciding,"
that decision is correct because both parties agreed
3. Turkhan v. Perryman,
188 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1999) - upholds - no equal protection violation
4. Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene,
190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999) - upholds - no equal protection violation
5. Almon v. Reno,
192 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999) - upholds - no equal protection violation
6. Domond v. INS,
244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001) - reaches same conclusion (no equal protection violation), but does not cite Board case.
7. Servin-Espinoza v. Ashcroft,
309 F.3d 1193 - rejects reasoning, pursuant to U.S. v.
Estrada-Torres, 179 F.
3d 776 (9th Cir. 1999) (see above), and remands for 212(c) in
limited category of cases |
C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (1997) (ID 3319) |
alien whose
spouse was forced to undergo abortion or sterilization may qualify as
refugee, and is eligible for asylum and withholding |
1. Zhao v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
265 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2001) - accepts, but finds precedent not properly applied here
2. Qiu v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) - cited generally with approval
3. Jie Lin v. Ashcroft,
356 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004), amended at 377 F.3d 1014 (2004) - cites with approval,
raises question of extension to children
4. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361
F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004) - extends holding to husbands whose traditional marriages are not recognized in
China because underage
5. Chen v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004) - finds it reasonable to limit
Board holding to married couples (rejecting Ma,
above)
6. Qu v. Gonzales,
399 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) - upholds,
as to both asylum and withholding
7. Zhang v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 531(5th Cir. 2004) - finds it reasonable to limit Board holding to married couples (rejecting Ma,
above) |
J-J-,
21 I&N Dec. 976 (1997) (ID 3323) |
A. Board
will reopen sua sponte despite filing defects in motion only where there is
an exceptional situation, not to cure filing defects or circumvent motions
restrictions
B. Appeal or
motion is deemed filed when received by the Board |
A. 1. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS,
272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) - cited generally with approval
Also
see on need for exceptional circumstances, Wang v.
Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2001)
A. 2. Johnson v. Ashcroft,
286 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 2002) - cites with approval
A. 3. Ekimian v. INS,
303 F.3d 1153 (th Cir. 2002 - cites with approval
B. Smith v. Connor,
250 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 4/25/01) - upholds |
S-A-,
21 I&N Dec. 1050 (1997) |
Heavy
traffic is not reasonable cause for failure to appear at exclusion hearing |
De
Jimenez v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2004) - distinguished,
because alien gave detailed description of a number of factors that caused
the failure to appear |
O-D-,
21 I&N Dec. 1079 (1998) |
Presenting
false ID can indicate overall lack of credibility |
Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2004) - holds false ID can't
be used against alien if he has no reason to know document is forged |
Dillingham,
21 I&N Dec. 1001 (1997) (ID3325), reversed (see cite) |
foreign
expungement of foreign drug conviction not effective for immigration
purposes, even if alien would have been eligible for first offender
treatment here |
Dillingham v. INS,* 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) - reversed |
Yewondwosen,
21 I&N Dec. 1025 (1997) (ID 3327) |
BIA may
grant MTR even if alien fails to submit application for relief in support of
the motion where INS actually joins the motion: Board has authority to
reopen even where there are technical deficiencies |
1.
Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 1999) - cited with approval (and goes somewhat further)
2.
Iavorski v. INS, 232
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2000) - generally cited for Board's power to reopen sua sponte |
Collado-Munoz,
21 I&N Dec. 1061 (1998) |
Fleuti doctrine did not
survive the passage of IIRIRA |
Tineo
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2003) - upholds |
O-D-,
21 I&N Dec. 1079 (1998) (ID 3334) |
BIA sets
forth two categories of false documents, noting use of such documents to
ease travel or entry may not impugn overall credibility |
Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1999) - agrees with concept of two classifications |
Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101(1998) (ID 3335) |
212(h) now
available to ag fels only if they are non-lprs, not lprs |
1. United States v. Arrieta,
224 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) - cited generally, but appears to accept Board ruling
2. Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001)- finds no equal protection violation in allowing only non-lprs to get 212(h) relief
3. Moore v. Ashcroft,
251 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2001) - does not cite Michel, but finds no equal protection violation
4. Lukowski v. INS,
279 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2002) - accepts decision, finds no equal protection violation
5. Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS,
291 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2002) - accepts decision, finds no equal protection
violation
6. DeLeon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft,
293 F.3d 633 (3d Cir. 2002) - accepts decision, finds no equal protection
violation
7. Taniguchi v. Schultz,
303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 8/23/02) - does not cite Michel,
but finds no equal
protection violation |
A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (1998) |
Board
generally defers to Immigration Judge credibility findings |
Mayo
v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.
1/27/03, amended 6/25/03) - cited generally with approval |
Y-B-,
21 I&N Dec. 1136 (1998) |
general,
meager testimony not enough in asylum case, and the weaker the testimony,
the greater the need for corroboration |
1. Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft,
390 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004) - distinguishes on facts
2. Mohamed v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2005) - cites generally with approval |
A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157 (1998) (ID 3338) |
reasonableness of fear of persecution reduced when family remains behind
without difficulty |
1.
Aguilar-Solis v. INS,
168 F.3d 565 (1st Cir. 1999) - generally cited for rule regarding family left behind
2. Rios v. Ashcroft,
287 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) - Without citing A-E-M-, cautions that continuing safety of family members is a relevant factor in
assessing fear, but not sufficient as basis for finding of no well-founded
fear
3. Eduard v. Ashcroft,
379 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, and states that holding is not limited to cases where
persecutor operates regionally |
M-D-,
21 I&N Dec. 1180 (1998) (ID 3339), remanded (see cite) |
failure to
provide corroborating evid where "reasonable to expect it" means failure to
meet burden of proof in asylum case |
1. Ladha v. INS,
215 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000) - corroboration req. "disapproved" if credible testimony
2. Diallo v. INS*,
232 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000) - upholds corrob. req (though remands on facts)
3. Miah v. Ashcroft,
346 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2003) -cites
generally with approval
4. Dorosh v. Ashcroft,
398 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 2004) - cites generally with approval |
Magallanes-Garcia, ID 3341 (1998); overruled Ramos, 23
I&N 336 (2002) |
conviction
under Az. law for aggravated driving while under the influence is conviction
of a "crime of violence," and thus an ag fel |
1. Tapia-Garcia v. INS,
237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001) - generally cited, with approval
2. U.S. v. Chapa-Garza,
243 F.3d 92, reh. en banc denied (with dissent), 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001) - without citing Magallanes, calls reasoning into
question
3. Bazan-Reyes v. INS,
256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001) - rejects definition of crime of violence
4. Dalton v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001) - rejects definition of crime of violence
5. U.S. v Trinidad-Aquino,
259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) - in sentence enhancement case, finds DUI with injury to another not a crime of violence (does not actually cite Magallanes-Garcia)
6. Francis v. Reno,
269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001) - distinguished,
because conviction here (under Pa. law) did not involve DUI |
O-Z-
& I-Z-, ID 3346 (1998) |
Board finds
harassment of Jews on account of religion rose to the level of persecution |
Abdille v.Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) - distinguished on facts |
J-P-,
ID 3348 (1998) |
headache not
exceptional circumstance excusing failure to appear where no medical or
other evidence to support claim |
1. Singh v. INS,
213 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) - upholds generally (but see B-A-S- case, below)
2. Celis-Castellano v.
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888
(9th Cir. 2002) - cites generally -
finds asthma attack 4 days before hearing did not excuse failure to appear |
B-A-S-, ID 3350 (1998) |
sore foot
not exceptional circumstance where alien did not submit affidavit from
doctor or employer, or contact court immediately |
1. Singh v. INS*, 213 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) - remands this precedent decision, finding
Board imposed new requirements without notice
2. Celis-Castellano v.
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888
(9th Cir. 2002) - cites generally, noting that here, no notice problems as in Singh (above) - asthma attack 4 days before hearing did not excuse failure to
appear |
X-G-W-, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (1998)( ID 3352),superseded, G-C-L- 23 I&N 359 (2002) |
Board
reopens despite time and number restrictions where fundamental change in law
(China population case) |
1. Lucacela v. Reno, 161
F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1998) - generally cited for rule that Board can reopen sua sponte to serve interests of justice
2. Ekimian v. INS,
303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) - generally cited for rule that Board can reopen sua sponte to serve interests of justice |
Mancera-Monroy, 22 I&N Dec. 79 (1998) |
No time
limit on MTR in absentia hearing where lack of notice of hearing is shown |
Andia
v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval |
Lei, 22 I&N Dec. 113 (1998)
(ID 3356) |
Claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to 180
limit for filing MTR in an in absentia case |
1. Behar v. Ashcroft,
324 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2003) - upholds Board ruling
2. Lopez v. INS,
184 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) -without citing Lei,
holds ineff.
assistance of counsel can toll time limits for in absentia MTR
3. Iavorski v. INS,
232 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2000) - without citing Lei,
holds ineff.
assistance of counsel can toll time limits for in absentia MTR
4. Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d
1253 (10th Cir. 2002) - without citing Lei,
holds ineff.
assistance of counsel can toll time limits for in absentia MTR
5. Borges v. Gonzales,
___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 712367 (3d Cir. 2005) - holds ineff. assistance of counsel
can toll time limits for in absentia MTR - distinguishes Bejar,
above, saying only that time limit can be tolled, not that
ineffective assistance is an exception to time limit |
Punu, ID 3364
(1998) |
A. After
IIRIRA, the third "finality" prong of Ozkok for determining if conviction exists, no longer exists
B. Deferred
adjudication of guilt under Texas law where probation is imposed is a
conviction for immigration purposes |
A. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d
994 (5th Cir. 1999) - upholds Board
B. Griffiths v. INS,
243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) - Board's holding a "permissible construction" of
statute. "Guilty-filed" disposition under Mass. law can be a conviction for
immigration purposes - but case remanded on facts. |
G-N-C-,
ID 3366 (1998) |
A. Decision
by INS to institute proceedings is not subject to review by Immigration
Judge or Board.
B. Without
discussion, applies IIRIRA's reinstatement of removal provisions § 241(a)(5)
to alien who reentered prior to IIRIRA's effective date. |
A. Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval
B. 1. Castro-Cortez, et al. v. Reno,
239 F.3d 1037(9th Cir. 2001) - rejects application of the statute to such aliens
B. 2. Velasquez-Gabriel v.
Crocetti, 263 F.3d 102
(4th Cir. 2001)- finds 241(a)(5) does apply to aliens
who reenter prior to statute's effective date (does not cite G-N-C-)
B. 3. Bejjani v. INS,
271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001) - rejects application of
statute to such aliens (cites G-N-C- in footnote, noting Board did not address issue) |
B-B-, ID 3367
(1998) |
No
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel made tactical decision, and
no egregious conduct |
Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21(1st Cir. 2001) - cites with approval,
and distinguishes |
N-M-A-,
ID 3368 (1998) |
A. asylum
may be granted due to compelling circumstances despite no well-founded fear
(though no compelling circumstances here)
B. Asylum
applicant has burden to show new source of persecution if no longer
well-founded fear from original source |
A.1.
Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d
998 (9th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval, but finds Board did not properly apply decision in this case -
finds grant of asylum under Chen does not require ongoing disability
A. 2. Brucaj v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval, but finds that decision did not set forth specific types
of evidence necessary for humanitarian asylum claims
B. Hasalla v. Ashcroft,
367 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval |
M-S-,
22 I&N Dec. 349) (ID 3369) (1998) |
A.
requirements for rescission of in absentia order not applicable to MTR that
does not seek rescission
B. cannot
deny discretionary relief without receiving oral notice of consequences of
failure to appear |
A. Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d
1097 (9th Cir. 1999) - cited with approval in footnote
B. Ordonez v. INS,
345 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2003) - cited with approval |
Lettman,
ID 3370 (1998), affirmed (see cite) |
alien
convicted of ag fel subject to deportation regardless of date of conviction
if placed in deportation proceedings on or after 3/1/91, and crime is within
ag fel definition |
1. Lettman v. INS*, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2000) - affirmed
2. Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d
539 (4th Cir. 1999) - upholds
3. Bell v. Reno,
218 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) - rejects Board and 11th and 4th Circuits' legal analysis,
but agrees with conclusion that alien is deportable as ag fel |
S-S-,
ID 3374 (1999); strongly criticized Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I&N 270 (AG2002) |
determination whether an alien convicted of an ag fel is barred from
withholding due to PSC (where sentenced to less than 5 years) requires
individual examination of the offense |
Chong
v. INS, 264 F.3d 378
(3d Cir. 2001) - cited with approval,
and notes actual individual hearing on issue of PSC not required |
Ruiz-Romero,
ID 3376 (1999), affirmed (see cite) |
alien
convicted of transporting illegal aliens within the U.S. subject to
deportation as ag fel |
Ruiz-Romero v. Reno*,
205 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2000) - affirmed |
Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (ID 3377) (1999), reversed in part (see cite) |
no effect to
be given in immigration proceedings to expungements, etc. |
1. Lujan-Armendariz v. INS and Roldan-Santoyo v. INS*, 222 F.3d 728 (9th 2000) - reversed,
but only insofar as Board decision relates to Federal First Offenders Act or
state counterparts
2. Herrera-Inirio v. INS,
208 F.3d (1st Cir. 2000) - upholds
3. Sandoval v. INS,
240 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) - distinguishes because sentence modification here, not expungement (and notes Roldan has been "called into question")
4. Murillo-Espinoza v. INS,
261F.3d 771(9th Cir. 2001) - upholds as "plausible" construction the Board's holding that state rehabilitative
expungements will not be given effect (but see #1 above, for exception)
5. Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS,
281 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2002) - upholds,
and specifically declines to adopt reasoning of Lujan-Armendariz
6. Gill v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2003) - upholds,
and specifically rejects Lujan-Armendariz (see #1 above)
7. Resendiz-Alcarez v. U.S.
Attorney General, 383
F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) - upholds
8. Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2005) - upholds rationale, but finds conviction here was not a felony |
Onyido,
ID 3379 (1999) |
"Attempt,"
as used in section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act is not limited to crimes
formally called "attempts." Intent to defraud plus "substantial step" to
commit fraud may be sufficient for attempt under (U). |
Sui v.
INS, 250 F.3d 105 (2d
Cir. 2001) - accepts
legal holding, but
finds no substantial step here (i.e. distinguishes on facts) |
Cervantes-Gonzales,
ID 3380 (1999), affirmed (see cite) |
IIRIRA
amendment to 212(i), adding hardship requirement, applies to cases pending
when IIRIRA was enacted |
Cervantes-Gonzales v. INS,* 244 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) - affirmed |
Rosas-Ramirez,
22 I&N Dec. 616 (1999) |
alien
convicted of ag fel after adjustment of status is deportable as alien
convicted of ag fel "after admission" |
Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2004) - distinguishes,
finding that alien admitted as lawful nonimmigrant who later adjusts should
have the later adjustment date used as his "admission" date in determining
if crime involving moral turpitude was within 5 years of admission |
Nolasco,
ID 3385 (1999) |
No
continuous physical presence for suspension if OSC is served less than 7
years after entry |
1. Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2000) - upholds (finds stop-time rule constitutional)
2. Gonzalez-Torres,
213 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2000) - upholds (stop-time rule constitutional)
3. Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2000) - upholds Nolasco,
but remands on facts re: brief, casual and innocent departure
4. Afolayan v. INS,
219 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2000) - upholds
5. Ayoub v. INS,
222 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000) - upholds (characterizes Gonzalez-Torres, above, as dicta)
6. Angel-Ramos v. INS,
227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2000) - upholds
7. Ashki v. INS,
233 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000) - upholds
8. Rojas-Reyes v. INS,
235 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2000) - upholds
9. Bartoszewska-Zajac v. INS,
237 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2001) - upholds,
and rejects equal protection arguments
10. Ram v. INS,
243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2001) - upholds
11. Guadalupe-Cruz v. INS,
240 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) - distinguished,
because Immigration Judge incorrectly applied stop-time law before its
effective date
12. Sad v. INS,
246 F.3d 811(6th Cir. 2001) - upholds, and also rejects retroactivity and equal protection arguments
13, Pinho v. INS,
249 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2001) - upholds
14. See also Tefel v. Reno,
180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) - without citing Nolasco, finds stop-time rule constitutional |
L-S-,
22 I&N Dec. 645 (ID 3386) (1999) |
determination whether an alien convicted of an ag fel is barred from
withholding due to PSC (where sentenced to less than 5 years) requires
individual examination of the offense |
1. Chong v. INS,
264 F.3d 378 (3d Cir. 2001) - cited with approval,
and notes actual individual hearing on issue of PSC not required
2. Bosede v. Ashcroft,
309 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2002) - cited generally with approval |
Perez, ID 3389
(1999) |
continuous
physical presence for cancellation of removal ends on date offense is
committed |
Henry
v. Ashcroft, 175 F.Supp. 2d 688 (S.D.N.Y 2001) - rejects,
holding application of new IIRIRA provision to offense committed pre-IIRIRIA
has improper retroactive effect |
Alvarado-Alvino, ID 3391 (1999) |
Ag fel under
101(a)(43)(N) includes only convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), not §
1325(a) |
Rivera-Sanchez v. Reno, 198 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 1999) - upheld |
H-A-, ID 3394
(1999); modified
Velarde, 23 I&N 253
(2002) |
Arthur,
20 I&N Dec. 475 (1992), requiring approved visa petition prior to reopening
for adjustment, survives regulations imposing MTR time limits (but Arthur modified by Velarde,
23 I&N 253 (2002) |
Balwinder Singh v. Quarantillo, 92 F.Supp. 2d 386 (D.N.J. 2000) - rejects Board majority and adopts dissent rationale |
Ponce-Hernandez,
ID 3397 (1999) |
Form I-213
is an inherently trustworthy, admissible document |
Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2001) - cites generally with approval |
R-S-J-, ID 3401
(1999) |
false
statements to asylum officer can constitute false testimony for purposes of
101(f)(6) |
Ramos
v. INS, 246 F.3d 1264
(9th Cir. 2001) (8th Cir. 7/16/04) - cites with approval |
Ajami, 22 I&N Dec. 949 (1999) |
gives
general crime involving moral turpitude defin as conduct that is vile, base,
depraved, etc. |
Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004) - defin. cited generally with
approval |
L-V-K-, ID 3409
(1999), vacated (see cite) |
A. motion to
remand filed while appeal of denial of MTR proceedings that are
administratively final is pending is untimely if filed more than 90 days
after the final order
B. In
absentia order becomes final when alien waives appeal or appeal time expires |
A.1. Konstantinova v. INS* (9th Cir.
4/3/00) - in unpublished order, without explanation, Board's precedent
was vacated. Earlier, published decision, at 195 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 1999), did
not deal with Board's precedent decision
A.2. Wang v. Ashcroft,
260 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2001) - upholds and applies to case
A.3. Krougliak v. INS, 289 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2002) - upholds
B. Kay v. Ashcroft,
387 F.3d 664 (7th Circuit. 2004) - cites with approval |
Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
ID 3411 (1999) |
crime of
indecency with a child by exposure under section 21.11(a)(2) of Texas law is
sexual abuse of a minor and thus an ag fel |
1. U.S. v. Zavala-Sustaita,
214 F.3d 601(5th Cir. 2000) - upheld
2. Guerrero-Perez v. INS,
242 F.3d 727(7th Cir. 2001) - upholds (conviction was for "criminal
sexual abuse" under Illinois law)
3. Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d
183 (1st Cir. 2001) - cites with approval (conviction was for indecent assault and battery on a child under
14 under Mass. law)
4. Lara-Ruiz v. INS,
241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001) - cites with approval
5. Bahar v. Ashcroft,
264 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) -Cites
with approval (conviction in N.C. for crime of taking indecent liberties with
a minor) |
Puente,
ID 3412 (1999); overruled Ramos, 23 I&N 336 (2002) |
conviction
of driving while intoxicated under Texas law is a crime of violence and thus
an ag fel |
1. Tapia Garcia v. INS,
237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001) - upholds Board decision as reasonable
2. U.S. v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, reh. en banc denied (with dissent), 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001) - without citing Puente, rejects holding
3. Bazan-Reyes v. INS,
256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001) - rejects
4. Dalton v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001) - rejects definition of crime of violence
5. U.S. v Trinidad-Aquino,
259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) - in sentence enhancement case,
finds DUI with
injury to another not a crime of violence (does not actually cite Puente) |
K-V-D-, ID 3422
(1999), overruled, Yanez,
23 I&N 390 (2002) |
court
interpretation of "ag fel" for sentence enhancement purposes does not
control interpretation for immigration purposes |
U.S.
v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001) - rejects holding |
Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (19990 |
A. Arizona
offense of aggravated DUI is a CIMT where the person knew he was prohibited
from driving
B. Simple
DUI, without more, is not CIMT |
A. Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects, finding statute is divisible and not all conduct covered by the statute is a
CIMT
B. Knapik v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) - agrees with |
Mendoza-Sandino, ID 3426 (2000) |
alien may
not accrue 7 years continuous physical presence for suspension after service
of OSC |
1. Afolayan v. INS,
219 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2000) - upholds as reasonable interpretation (see
also Escudero-Corona v. INS,
244 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2001) - same result
2. McBride v. INS,
238 F.3d 371(5th Cir. 2001) - upholds as reasonable interpretation
3. Ram v. INS,
243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2001) - upholds |
S-V-,
22 I&N Dec. 1306 (2000) |
For CAT
relief, govt must be "willfully accepting" of the torturous activities |
Zheng
v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects, and holds that CAT's "acquiescence" requirement only requires that the govt.
have "awareness" of the torture, not actual knowledge or willful acceptance
of it |
Perez, ID 3432
(2000) |
burglary of
a vehicle not a "burglary offense" within section 101(a)(43)(G) ag fel
definition |
1. Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d
1128 (9th Cir. 2000) - decided 3 days after Perez, reaches same
conclusion
2. Lopez-Elias v. Reno,
209 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) -decided a month before Perez, reaches same
conclusion |
S-A-,
22 I&N Dec. 1328 (2000) |
persecution
inflicted by family member can form basis for asylum claim |
Faruk
v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2004) - cited with approval |
V-Z-S-, ID 3434 (2000) |
offense is
"theft offense" under section 101(a)(43)(G) if there is intent to deprive
owner of property, even if deprivation is less than total or permanent |
Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. 2001) upholds (court dealt with Ill. crime of possession of stolen vehicle) |
Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (2001) |
NY
adjudication as youthful offender is equiv. to federal juvenile delinquency
determination and does not constitute conviction for immigration purposes |
Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2005) - agrees with, but
distinguishes, in
interpreting Michigan statute |
Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. 1378 (2000) |
conviction
that is vacated, not expunged, does not constitute conviction for
immigration purposes |
1.
Sandoval v. INS, 240
F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) - generally cited, with approval
2. Discipio v. Ashcroft,
369 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2004) - without citing, reluctantly rejects, relying on Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS,
322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003)
3. Johnson v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2004) - generally cited, with approval |
Bahta, ID 3437
(2000) |
conviction
for attempted possession of stolen property is conviction of receipt of
stolen property, and a theft offense and thus an ag fel |
1. U.S. v.Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122 (10th
Cir. 2001) - generally upholds specifically adopts 7th Circuit reasoning in Hernandez-Mancilla (see below) - sentencing enhancement case
2. Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS,
246 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. 2001) - generally upholds, but reads "theft offense" somewhat more broadly (court dealt
with Ill. crime of possession of stolen vehicle) |
Davis,
22 I&N Dec. 1411 (2000), affirmed (see cite) |
alien is
ineligible for 212(c) if served more than 5 years in prison, even if AEDPA
section 440(d) does not apply |
1. Toia v. Fasano,
334 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects (without actually citing),
finding 5-year bar does not apply to aliens who pleaded guilty prior to 1990
Act, and who are otherwise eligible
2. Davis v. Ashcroft,
2003 WL 289624 (S.D.N.Y. 2/10/03) affirmed (but not reported in
F.Supp. 2d) |
Vasquez-Muniz, ID 3440 (2000); overruled Vasquez-Muniz,
23 I&N 207 (2002) |
Possession
of firearm by felon under
Calif.
law is not an ag fel. |
United
States v. Castillo-Rivera,
244 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) - without citing Board ID, reaches opposite conclusion (case involves same Calif. law) - finds it is an ag fel. |
Crammond, 23 I&NDec. 9 (2001) vacated,
23 I&N Dec. 179(2001) |
conviction
for sexual abuse of a minor must be for felony offense to be ag fel under
101(a)(43)(A), but decision vacated |
Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 256 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001) - rejects (holds it could be misdemeanor offense) |
Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (2001) |
Arizona conviction for aggravated DUI with two or more priors is
not CIMT |
Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval, on holding that where statute is divisible, must determine
whether all conduct covered by the statute is a CIMT |
Rodriguez-Tejedor,
23 I&N Dec. 153 (2001) |
person who
was over 18 on effective date of Child Citizenship Act of 2000 not eligible
for automatic citizenship |
1. Hughes v. Ashcroft,
255 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2001) - without citing, reaches same conclusion
2. Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d
415 (5th Cir. 2001) - without citing, reaches same conclusion
3. Ali v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2005) - follows |
Song, 23 I&N Dec.173 (2001) |
where state
court vacates sentence and resentences alien to less than 1 year, not ag fel
conviction |
Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval |
G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (2001) |
in absentia
order inappropriate where alien did not receive, or cannot be charged with
receiving, NTA |
Dominguez v. INS, 284 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) - without citing
Board case, calls
holding into question - notice to last address formally provided is sufficient |
Y-L-,
A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002) |
A. CAT
protection requires that the torture be inflicted "under color of law"
B. Ag. fels.
involving drug trafficking are presumptively particularly serious crimes |
A.1.
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332
F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) - rejects, and holds that CAT's "acquiescence" requirement only requires that the govt.
have "awareness" of the torture, not actual knowledge or willful acceptance
of it
A.2. Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004) - disapproves of requirement of official
"consent or approval" of torture
B. Ali v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2005) - applies presumption, but remands to give alien chance to rebut |
J-E-,
23 I&N Dec. 291 (2002) |
A.
substandard prison conditions in Haiti do not constitute torture where no
evidence authorities create and maintain such conditions to inflict torture
B. Torture
must be by or with consent or acquiescence of public official who has
custody or physical control of victim
C. Detaining
returning criminals is lawful sanction as Haiti has right to protect its
citizens from criminals
D. Torture
must be intentionally inflicted |
A.1. Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) - distinguishes
A.2. Saint Fort v. Ashcroft,
223 F.Supp.2d 343 (D. Mass. 2002) - distinguishes on facts,
finding Board did not consider evidence presented
A.3. Elien v Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 392 (1st Cir. 2004) - upholds generally, but notes that respondent had not shown that torture is widespread
in Haitian prisons
A.4. Cadet v. Bulger,
377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004) - upholds
A.4. Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161 2d Cir. 2004) - distinguishes,
because Board has found widespread torture in
Egypt's
prison (and warns that J-E- was cited by the
Board in this case for a broader, and erroneous, proposition)
B. Azanor v. Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) - rejects holding that public official must have custody or physical control of victim
C.1. Elien v Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 392 (1st Cir. 2004) - upheld (but notes indefinite detention might not be lawful)
C.2. Cadet v. Bulger,
377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004) - upholds (even if indefinite detention)
A-D. Auguste v. Ridge, 395
F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005) - Upholds all parts of J-E-and
finds part of Zubeda, above, dicta |
Ramos, 23 I&N Dec. 336 (2002) |
DUI a crime
of violence under § 16(b) only if committed at least recklessly and involves
substantial risk force will be used |
1. Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d
710 (8th Cir. 2002) - distinguishes from conviction under
Minn. law for criminal vehicular
homicide
2. U.S. v. Lucio-Lucio,
347 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003) - cites with approval
3. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) - reserves question
of DUI as crime of violence where statute requires proof of reckless conduct, but finds DUI that causes serious bodily injury is not a crime of
violence |
G-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 366 (2002) |
In ruling on
CAT claim, should consider relevant country conditions |
Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2005) - cites with approval, but finds Board did not apply case |
Yanez-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (2002) |
whether
state drug offense is drug trafficking crime ag fel shall be decided based
on circuit law |
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004) - cites with approval,
and follows 2d and 3d Circuits in finding state felony drug poss conviction
that would be misd under federal law is not ag fel
Liao v. Rabbett,
398 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2005) - cites generally, and finds felony drug conviction not ag fel where not punishable under state law by
imprisonment for more than 1 year |
Romalez, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (2002) |
for
cancellation, cont. physical presence ends with departure made under threat
of institution of deportation or removal proceedings |
1. Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft,
315 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2003), amended 343 F.3d 961 - upheld
2. Mirales-Valdez v. Ashcroft,
349 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2003) - upheld
3. Palomino v. Ashcroft,
354 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2004) - upheld
4. Morales-Morales v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2004) - distinguished, where alien was simply turned back at the border |
Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448 (2002) |
offense is
not a crime of violence if it does not involve as an element the use of
violent or destructive physical force |
Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003) - cited generally with approval |
Martin, 23 I&N Dec. 491 (2002) |
third degree
assault under Connecticut
law is a crime of violence and thus an ag fel |
1. Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft,
327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003) - rejected: offense found not to be crime of violence
2. Flores v. Ashcroft,
350 F.3d 666, (7th Cir. 2003) - rejects,
and finds Indiana battery conviction not a crime of violence
3. Singh v. Ashcroft,
2004wl2360149 (9th Circuit. 2004) - distinguishes because Martin dealt with state stature that required intent to inflict
physical injury |
Mejia-Andino, 23 I&N Dec. 533 (2002) |
Service of
notice of hearing for minor under 14 must be made on near relative - service
on uncle not sufficient where service of parent possible |
Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004) - without mentioning
case, appears to
modify to cover minors up to age 18 |
Navas-Acosta, 23 I&N
Dec. 586 (2003) |
person can
become "national" of the U.S. only by birth or naturalization, not by filing
oath of allegiance with natz application |
1. Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2003) - agrees with holding
2. Salim v. Ashcroft,
350 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2003) - agrees with holding |
Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (2003) |
If
conviction vacated solely for rehabilitation or immigration reasons, alien
remains convicted for immigration purposes |
Ali v.
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2005) - finds Board's construction
reasonable and defers to it |
Y-T-L-,
23 I&N Dec. 601(2003) |
where past
pers. is shown based on forced sterilization, presumption of future pers. is
not rebutted on theory that no further threat is faced |
Qu v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) - upholds,
as to both asylum and withholding |
Please note that this chart is
provided as a convenience to the public and is not intended for use as a legal
document when preparing an appeal or for citation purposes.
|